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PREFACE
Public Law and National Policy require Federal agencies to
establish automated information systems security programs to
assure adequate levels of security for all agency automated
information systems, whether maintained in-house or commercially.
Automated information systems security is becoming an
increasingly important issue for all NASA managers. Rapid
advancements in computer technology and the demanding nature of
space exploration and space research have made NASA increasingly
dependent on computers to store, process, and transmit vast
amounts of mission support information. In many cases, automated
processes are an integral function that directly contributes to
the success of a NASA mission. In today's electronically-based
society, the practice of effective computer security management
principles is an inherent function of good business and good
professional practice.
The computer security management processes covered by this
Handbook exemplify our efforts to assure that scientific missions
and business functions are carried out in an accurate, safe,
accountable, and efficient manner. This Handbook, in addition to
NMI 2410.7, "Assuring the Security and Integrity of NASA
Automated Information Resources," provides consistent policies,
procedures, and guidance to assure that an aggressive and
effective program is developed, implemented, and sustained. The
provisions of this Handbook apply to all NASA organizations and
NASA support contractors. Generally excluded are contractor or
research facility automated information resources not under
direct NASA management control.
This Handbook is intended primarily for use by Program Office
Computer Security Managers (PO-CSM's) at Headquarters and Center
Computer Security Managers (CCSM's) at field centers; however, it
has been structured to allow anyone from senior management to
technical support personnel to quickly understand the overall
concepts and thiir personal relationship to the program. The
intention of providing implementation flexibility in the guidance
portions is to encourage the exercise of sound judgement by those
closest to a problem. PO-CSM's and CCSM's are expected to apply
common sense in determining appropriate variations and exceptions
that may become necessary in specific computing environments.
Preceding page blank	 vii
This Handbook is issued in loose-leaf form and will be revised by
page changes. Comments and suggestions concerning this Handbook
should be addressed to the NASA Automated Information Security
Program Manager, Code NTD, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC
20546.
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CHAPTER 1. PROGRAM OVERVIEW
100 INTRODUCTION
a. Management Issue. Computer security is an increasingly
important issue for all NASA managers. Modern technology and the
demands of space research have made NASA more and more dependent
on computers to store and process vast amounts of information
that support sensitive and mission-critical functions. NASA's
computer and information assets have such great value that they
must be managed to the same extent as the more traditional
organizational assets (i.e., people, money, equipment, natural
resources, and time).
b. Value of Information and Computing Resources. The
value of NASA's information and computing resources and the
importance of NASA missions create a need for these resources to
be adequately protected to assure availability, integrity, and
confidentiality, as appropriate. The appropriate protection of
automated information must be motivated and supported by the
managers who own or use that information.
C.	 Life-Cycle Phases. Some automated systems are acquired
"off the shelf" and can be used immediately. Others must be
specially designed, developed, and implemented over months or
years. Once an automated system is fully operational, the
options available to provide computer security are somewhat
limited. However, if security is designed into an automated
system, the safeguard options are vastly increased and the
safeguard costs over the life of the system are substantially
reduced. This is true for computer hardware, system software,
and application software. Therefore, it is important for NASA
managers to ensure that security is appropriately addressed in
all phases of the life cycle for automated systems, especially in
the early planning stages.
d.	 History. In the past, NASA computer security guidance
was provided through the following:
(1) NASA Handbook (NHB) 2410.1, "Information
Processing Resources Management," April 1985.
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(2) Assorted NASA policy letters, such as:
(a) "Interim Standard for Identification of NASA
Sensitive Automated Information and
Applications," NASA Headquarters (HQ) Code NT
letter, November 1987.
(b) "Responding to and Reporting Automated
Information Security Incidents," NASA HQ Code
NT letter, January 1988.
(3) Assorted NASA guidelines, such as:
(a) "Guidelines for Certification of Existing
Sensitive Systems," July 1982.
(b) "Guidelines for Development of NASA Computer
Security Training Programs," May 1983.
(c) "Guidelines for Developing NASA ADP Security
Risk Management Plans," August 1983.
(d) "Guide-'fines for Developing NASA ADP Security
Risk Reduction Decision Studies," January
1984.
(e) "NASA ADP Risk Analysis Guidelines," July
1984.
(f) "NASA Guidelines for Assuring the Adequacy
and Appropriateness of Security Safeguards in
Sensitive Applications," September 1984.
(g) "NASA Guidelines for Meeting DOD
Accreditation Requirements for Processing
Classified Data," March 1985.
(h) "Guidelines for Contingency Planning,"
November 1982.
(i) "Guidelines for Selection of Backup
Strategies," November 1982.
e.	 References. App^:ndix A lists the references used in
this Handbook, which expands on NMI 2410.7, "Assuring the
Security and Integrity of NASA Automated Information Resources,"
and replaces the following:
(1) NHB 2410.1, Chapter 3.
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(2) All prior computer security policy letters.
(3) All of the documents listed in subparagraph d(3).
f.	 Terminology. Appendix B is a list of abbreviations.
Appendix C provides definitions for most of the terms used in
this Handbook. Given the number of terms unique to the computer
and/or security disciplines, readers should familiarize
themselves with the definitions in Appendix C before going on to
Chapter 2.
101 PURPOSE
The purpose of this Handbook is to present more specific
guidance on the general computer security management
philosophies, policies, and requirements outlined in NMI 2410.7.
This Handbook is intended to be used by the Center Computer
Security Managers (CCSM's) and HQ Program Office Computer
Security Managers (PO-CSM's). This Handbook is not intended to
be site specific. Censers are encouraged to supplement this
Handbook with procedures, duties, and titles in order to tailor
guidance to their unique environments.
102 ORGANIZATIONAL SCOPE
a. The provisions of this Handbook apply to all NASA
organizations and support contractor organizations as provided by
law and/or contract and as implemented by the appropriate
contracting officer. Generally excluded are contractor or
research facility computing and information resources not under
direct NASA management cognizance or that are merely incidental
to a contract (e.g., a contractor's payroll and personnel
system). The managing organization (i.e., NASA center or NASA HQ
Program Office) may, through the appropriate contracting officer,
elect to include any information and computing resources excluded
by this Handbook.
b. Within reason, the provisions of this Handbook should
be applied in university environments (where NASA is supported
through formal agreements such as grants, cooperative agreements,
contracts, and purchase orders). NASA managers/sponsors of such
activities should take a reasonable approach that will not impose
unnecessary constraints on the open university environment. The
extent of compliance with this Handbook in university
environments needs to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis and
may range from minimal compliance (i.e., for one-time research
activities in which there is no clear indication that NASA is the
information owner) to more stringent compliance (i.e., for
universities processing NASA-owned information on a long-term
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basis). A risk assessment should be conducted to identify
acceptable risk exposures and determine how unacceptable risk
exposures can reasonably be reduced to more acceptable levels.
103 SYSTEMS COVERED
This Handbook covers the protection of all NASA computer
systems including the information they store and process. It also
provides for the continuity of operations of computer systems and
applications.
104 EXCEPTIONS
In certain situations, other protective measures may already
be in place to meet the general requirements contained in this
Handbook. Exceptions from implementing the specifics of this
Handbook may be granted by the managing organization overseeing
the data processing installation's (DPI) activities. Delegation
of this exception authority shall be no lower than the CCSM. PO-
CSM's have exception authority for systems under their purview.
105 NASA COMPUTER SYSTEMS ENVIRONMENT
NASA represents one of the larger, more complex, and diverse
computing environmer,l's in the Federal Government. NASA has an
annual information technology resource budget exceeding $1
billion that supports nine NASA centers and the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory (JPL). It is recognized that while JPL is viewed as a
NASA center, it is a facility performing research and development
for NASA under contract to California Institute of Technology
(Caltech) and thus NASA policy is applicable to JPL to the extent
provided for in the NASA/Caltech contract. These centers manage
computer resources on a decentralized basis at a large number of
DPI's, many of which are operated under contract. The computer
system configurations range from the largest mainframe and
supercomputers to minicomputers, microcomputers, and
intelligent/engineering work stations. Computing operations
support earth and space mission functions for a full array of
processing environments ranging from administrative computing in
office settings to scientific and engineering computing in
academic, research center, production plant, and space vehicle
environments. Providing appropriate protection in such diverse
environments involves a continuing management process of
balancing user needs for unrestricted access to information with
the sometimes conflicting requirements to control access and
preserve integrity.
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106 IMPORTANCE OF AN EFFECTIVE COMPUTER SECURITY PROGRAM
a. Public Image. NASA has high public visibility due to
the nature of its operations. Human safety during manned space
flight and the success of research and military missions in space
are highly dependent on the reliability of supporting computer
resources and the integrity of automated information. Public and
Congressional confidence in the Space Program are directly keyed
to the clarity of NASA's commitment to excellence in all areas.
b. Increasing Incidents. In recent years all Federal
agencies have experienced an increase in international electronic
intrusions and electronic worm/virus penetrations. These
problems are expected to become more technically complex and more
widespread with advancements in computer and telecommunication
technologies. Therefore, it has become increasingly important to
develop a Computer Security Incident Response (CSIR) capability
to minimize the effects of such incidents. See paragraph 309 for
details of such a response capability.
C. Management Priority. The importance to senior NASA
management of an effective computer security program was
indicated by the NASA Administrator in a policy letter dated July
8, 1988, to all NASA employees. The letter expressed the
Administrator's personal expectations for "full support ...
cooperation ... and an aggressive program ...."
107 NASA AUTOMATED INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM BACKGROUND
a.	 Initial Policy. In 1979 NASA formally implemented its
computer security program by defining and promulgating agencywide
policies regarding the security and integrity of agency computing
facilities. The main focus was on maintaining continuity of
operations and minimizing the potential for improper use of
computing facilities. These policies were issued in accordance
with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-71,
Transmittal Memorandum No. 1, July 27, 1978, "Security of Federal
Automated Information Systems." This memorandum required each
Federal agency to establish a computer security program.
b. Initial Handbook. NASA's basi
policy was augmented in 1980 with the p
guidelines for implementing computer sec
the agency. These guidelines were publi
"Information Processing Resources Manage
updated in 1982 and again in 1985. NASA
policy (circa 1979) until 1988, when it
"Assuring the Security and Integrity of
Information Resources." NASA then began
computer security program to bring the a
c computer security
ublication of extensive
urity requirements within
shed in NHB 2410.1,
ment." NHB 2410.1 was
operated under its basic
published NMI 2410.7,
NASA Automated
restructuring its
gency into compliance
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with the Ccmputer Security Act of 1987 and technological advances
in computing and telecommunication systems.
C. Summary of Other Milestones. The agency has had an
established computer security program since 1979; a full-time
automated Information Security Program Manager since 1985;
computer security awareness and training ( CSAT) since 1983; and
management evaluations of agency computer security activities
since 1979.
108 ORIGIN OF NATIONAL POLICY
a.	 National Organizations. As presented in Exhibit 1-1,
the NASA Automated Information Security Program is based on
public laws promulgated by Congress. The following organizations
then issued national policies, standards, and guidelines:
(1) The Department of Commerce (DOC).
(2) The National Institute for Standards and
Technology (NIST).
(3) The Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
(4) The Office of Personnel Management (OPM).
(5) The National Security Agency (NSA).
(6) The Department of Defense (DOD).
(7) The General Services Administration (GSA).
(8) Various Presidential committees on computer and
telecommunications systems security.
b. National Document.q. National policy and guidance
documents include:
(1) Computer Security Act of 1987 (PL 100-235).
(2) Executive Order 12356.
(3) OMB Circular A-130.
(4) NIST Federal Information Processing Standards
(FIPS) Publications.
(5) DOD guidance on protecting classified information.
(6) NSA guidance on trusted computer systems.
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(7) OPM Personnel Letter 732.
(8) GSA Federal Information Resource Management
Regulation (FIRMR).
(9) GSA Federal Information Processing Management
Regulation.
(10)GSA Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).
1-7
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CHAPTER 2. PROGRAM ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
200 INTRODUCTION
This Chapter covers the NASA Automated Information Security
Program goal, objectives, organizational structure and
management.
201 MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHIES
a. Integration. The NASA Automated Information Security
Program is designed to provide appropriate, cost-effective
protection for sensitive, classified, mission critical, life
support, and high-dollar-value information and computing
resources. In this regard, NASA has an extensive computer
security program that is highly integrated into its management
functions through points-of-contact, intra-agency working groups,
councils, and committees. These management and coordinating
bodies range from a senior management Information Resources
Management (IRM) Council to CCSM's, local Data Processing
Installation Computer Security Officials (DPI-LSO's), and
Computer Security Coordinators (CSC's) at the computer system
level.
b. Decentralization. Due to NASA's highly decentralized
approach to managing a large number of diverse computer
environments nationwide, a decentralized approach for managing
automated information security has been taken. NASA HQ
interprets national policy and guidance and issues general policy
and guidance appropriate for the NASA computing environment.
Each center is responsible for establishing and sustaining a
computer security program that assures that each DPI under its
cognizance complies with computer security requirements that are
consistent with the DPI's unique computing environment. Specific
protective decisions (e.g., cost-effective approaches, benefits
to be derived) are made by management at the center and DPI
levels based on risk assessment activities. Functional security
requirements and technical security specifications are to be
integrated into appropriate system life-cycle phases and
appropriate security-related responsibilities included in job
descriptions and performance evaluation criteria. Compliance is
assured through multiple levels of top-down management and
compliance review activities.
C.
	 Perfection. A state of absolute protection is not
practical nor desirable in most cases. Numerous reasons include
the following:
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(1) Absolute protection would make the agency's
systems virtually unusable by the research community for which
the agency's mandate, under the Space Act of 1958, is to provide
the most useful information to the widest possible audience.
(2) Some vulnerabilities may not be known, as in the
case where vendor-supplied operating systems contain security
flaws.
(3) Computer and network technology is constantly
advancing at a rapid pace. While these advances create new
opportunities for our scientists and engineers, they also offer
new opportunities for those who wish to do mischief.
(4) Protection must be applied in a cost-effective
manner in order to meet agency responsibilities in its
expenditures of public funds.
202 NASA AUTOMATED INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAI4 GOAL
AND OBJECTIVES
a. Goal. The goal of the NASA Automated Information
Security Program is to provide cost-effective protection that
assures the integrity, availability, and confidentiality of NASA
automated information resources. Thus, the main focus in
scientific and engineering environments is to provide appropriate
cost-effective protection and management emphasis that assures
the appropriate levels of information integrity and computing
resource availability without unnecessarily impacting innovative
productivity or the advancement of technology. In these
environments and in the administrative environments, where the
sensitive or classified nature of information calls for mandatory
or discretionary protection from unauthorized disclosure,
additional consideration must be given for providing cost-
effective protection that assures information confidentiality.
b. Obiectives. The objectives of the NASA Automated
Information Security Program are to:
(1) Protect against deliberate or accidental
corruption of NASA automated information.
(2) Protect against deliberate or accidental actions
that cause NASA automated information resources to be unavailable
to users when needed.
(3) Ensure that there is no deliberate or accidental
disclosure of NASA sensitive or classified automated information.
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203 PROGRAM ELEMENTS
a.	 Basic Elements. The basic elements of the NASA
Automated Information Security Program are illustrated in Exhibit
2-1. They are to be employed in appropriate combinations to
adequately protect sensitive, critical, valu7Lte, and important
NASA information and computing assets at acceptable levels of
risk. The NASA Automated Information Security Program covers
both classified and unclassified assets.
(1) Computer Security Policy/Guidance. Computer
security policies and guides are needed to define the overall
framework (including lines of authority, main points-of-contact,
range of responsibilities, requirements, procedures, and
management processes) for implementing and sustaining an
efficient and cost-effective NASA Automated Information Security
Program.
(2) Computer Security Planning. Computer security
planning rust provide a consistent and specific approach for
determining short- and long-range management objectives,
developing security enhancement proposals, mapping proposals to
budget requests, and assuring the implementation of appropriate
cost-effective protective measures.
(3) Sensitivity and Criticality Identification. The
information and computing resources used to support NASA missions
have various levels of sensitivity and criticality. These levels
need to be determined, since they are critical to deciding which
protective measures are most appropriate.
(4) Risk Management. NASA managers need to
continually identify and analyze potential threats to NASA's
computing environments and reduce risk exposures to acceptable
levels. This process is called risk management.
(5) Protective Measure Baseline. There are numerous
combinations of technical, physical, administrative, and
personnel protective measures available to NASA managers. A
baseline of these protective measures needs to be
defined/suggested to facilitate development of acceptable levels
of protection for computing and information resources managed by
NASA or operated/processed in support of NASA missions.
(6) Certifications/Recertifications. 	 Certifications
and recertifications of automated applications document that
current risk levels are acceptable. They also document the
accountability for the acceptance of residual risks and complete
the evaluation process for protective measures (controls and
checks) programmed into automated applications.
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(7) Multilevel Compliance Assurance Mechanism.
Management and compliance reviews should be periodically
conducted to sustain optimal security levels at all centers and
DPI's.
(8) Incident Response. It is necessary to develop
specific and appropriate responses to the various security
incidents that may occur. It is also necessary to provide
feedback information to senior management on significant incident
situations. This information also supports the tracking of
agencywide trends.
(9) Continuous LSAT. Continuous CSAT is necessary to
elevate and sustain management and personnel awareness and
provide specific guidance to personnel who design, implement,
use, or maintain computer systems.
b.	 Sustaining Program Effectiveness. After policies and
procedures have been established and initial security management
tasks have been accomplished at the centers and DPI's, the
ongoing aspects of risk assessment, recertification, computer
security awareness and training, and compliance review activities
should continually refresh local automated information security
programs and keep them alive. The ongoing aspects of significant
incident reporting and annual submission of automated information
security program plans should provide managers at the center and
HQ levels with sufficient information to continually reassess
current program status and determine future management direction.
204 NASA COMPUTER SECURITY POLICY
It is NASA policy that:
a. Technical,
b. Personnel,
C.
	
Administrative,
d. Environmental, and
e. Access
protective measures be used, alone or in combination, to cost-
effectively provide an appropriate level of protection for NASA
automation assets, and especially for automated information. The
rigor of controls should be commensurate with the sensitivity
level of the information resources to be protected. Selection of
protective measures for a specific computing environment should
be based on an assessment of risks and the existence of
reasonable ratios between the costs/benefits of proposed
protective measures and the sensitivity, criticality, and/or
value of the assets requiring protection. Appropriate emphasis
should be placed on:
2-5
f. Automated information,
g. Computer hardware, and
h. Computer software
to assure that they are appropriately protected from threats that
include unauthorized:
i. Access,
j. Alteration,
k. Destruction,
1.	 Removal (e.g., theft),
M.
	 Disclosure,
n. Use/abuse, and
o. Delays
as a result of improper actions or adverse events.
205 HEADQUARTERS ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES
a. Overview. There are many organizations that have roles
and responsibilities related to implementing and managing the
NASA Automated Information Security Program, although the Head of
each Federal agency has ultimate responsibility.
b. Multidisciplinary Coordination
(1) Management Disciplines. All traditional
management disciplines and functions must be employed in a
coordinated fashion to effectively manage security. The reason
for this multidisciplinary situation is that, over the years,
NASA has become more eleztronically-based and dependent on
automation technologies to support all aspects of its operations
and missions.
(2) security Disciplines. As shown in Exhibit 2-2,
there are many security-related disciplines, each with its own
set of policies and procedures. Each security discipline is
almost always an entirely separate career field throughout the
Federal Government. Only when all such disciplines are working
together, in a highly coordinated fashion, can the entire
security process function properly and efficiently. Thus, it is
important for comput,"r security managers at all levels to
regularly coordinate with other security-related disciplines.
C. NASA Automated Information Security
As shown in Exhibit 2-3, NASA primary authori
agencywide computer security program has been
the Assistant Administrator for Management to
Associate Administrator for IRM. In addition
requirements of NMI 2410.7:
Program Manager.
ty for managing an
delegated through
the Assistant
to the general
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(1) The Assistant Associate Administrator for IRM
shall:
(a) Designate a management official knowledgeable
in both computing and computer security management principles and
practices to be the NASA Automated Information Security Program
Manager; and
(b) Apprise Center Directors, through appropriate
Program Associate Administrators, of program management reviews
conducted in response to the requirements of NMI 2410.7 and this
Handbook and make recommendation for improvements, as
appropriate.
(2) The NASA Automated Information Security Program
Manager shall:
(a) Serve as an agency focal point of
coordination among NASA senior management, HQ Program Offices,
centers, and external organizations on automated information
security matters.
(b) Develop and coordinate the implementation of
agency plans, policies, procedures, and guidelines related to the
requirements of NMI 2410.7 and this Handbook.
(c) Conduct program management reviews of centers
to assess the sustained effectiveness of center management
oversight processes that have been implemented at DPI's under
center management cognizance and make recommendations to the
Assistant Associate Administrator for IRM, through the Director,
IRM Policy Division, for improvement, as appropriate.
(d) Coordinate the review and dissemination of
information identifying emerging trends to keep NASA management
informed.
d.	 Headcruarters Program Offices. In addition to the
general requirements of NMI 2410.7, Program Associat<.-
Administrators shall:
(1) Promulgate Program Office specif.:;: pol'.cie::,
procedures, and guidelines related to the general requirements of
NMI 2410.7 and this Handbook, as deemed appropriate.
(2) Designate a management official knowledgeable in
both computing and computer security methods and practices to be
the PO-CSM. The PO-CSM should serve as a focal point to
coordinate agencywide activities required in NMI 2410.7 and this
Handbook between the HQ Automated Information Security Program
Manager and cognizant Program Office organizations. In cases
2-9
where multiple organizational levels or program area applications
exist, Assistant PO-CSM's and/or CSC's may be designated to
accomplish specific computer security responsibilities.
(3) Implament and coordinate an appropriate management
oversight process that ensures awareness and compliance with
applicable portions of NMI 2410.7 and this Handbook in cognizant
organizations.
(4) Assure that all NASA and appropriate NASA
contractor computing and telecommunications resources processing
NASA information are identified and included under the management
of a DPI.
(5) Assure that, through the contracting officer, all
appropriate contractors are required to comply with applicable
provisions of NMI 2410.7 and this Handbook.
(6) Review and concur on exceptions from implementing
specific requirements of this Handbook.
e. Other Headquarters Offices. Other HQ offices that play
an integral role include the:
(1) Inspector General, which has independent audit and
criminal investigation responsibilities.
(2) NASA Security Office, which has traditional
security responsibilities in the areas of
personnel security, physical security, and
national (including defense-related) security
documents and operations control.
(3) Office of Space Operations, which has agencywide
responsibilities for telecommunications security.
(4) Office of Procurement, which has responsibilities
for ensuring that appropriate functional security
requirements are included in acquisitions for
automated information products and services.
(5) Management Operations Office, which has
responsibilities for the NASA Internal Controls
Program.
(6) Office of Safety, Reliability, Maintainability,
and Quality Assurance, which has responsibilities
related to automated information resources
supporting manned space flight.
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206 INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR COMPUTER SECURITY
As illustrated in Exhibit 2-4, tie situation discussed in
paragraph 205 dictates that virtually everyone in the
organization who manages, designs, programs, operates, or uses
NASA automated information resources has personal job-related
responsibilities that contribute toward meeting the goal and
objectives of the NASA Automated Information Security Program.
The practice of effective computer security management principles
normally becomes an integral function of good business/
professional practice when it can be demonstrated that positive
benefits can be derived. For example:
a. Appropriately restricting unauthorized access can
greatly contribute to ensuring information/system
integrity and availability.
b. Systems that are well planned and passed through a
quality assurance/certification process are normally
more efficient and have fewer maintenance problems in
operational use.
C. Technology that is used in a controlled environment can
be expected to have greater reliability.
207 PROGRAM ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
a. In order to effectively manage the day-to-day aspects
of a computer security program, in a large and diverse
organization like NASA, a network of designated managers must be
established at all levels throughout the organization. Exhibit
2-5 illustrates the relationship between NASA-designated computer
security managers and officials at the HQ, center, and DPI
levels.
b. Headquarters Level. The NASA Automated Information
Security Program Manager has a direct working relationship and
communications link with HQ PO-GSM's and CCSM's to focus on
resolving NASA issues.
C.
	 Center Level. Each CCSM has a direct working
relationship and communication link with Dr._ CSO's to focus on
resolving center-level issues.
208 MANAGEMENT REVIEW AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE k'11.)CESS
Since computer security compliance levels have an in`ierant
tendency to degrade with time, management revie-.ws are necessary
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to retain a high level of compliance. Therefore, the NASA
Automated Information Security Program will require periodic
management reviews at all levels.
a. Headquarters Reviews. NASA HQ will conduct periodic
management reviews of centers to evaluate their management and
coordination of programs at DPI's under their cognizance.
b. Center Reviews. Centers will conduct periodic
compliance reviews at DPI's under their cognizance at least eery
1 to 3 years. Review activities should be focused in the
following four areas:
(1) Tracking Systems and Random Checks. Tracking
systems are needed to monitor recommendations from review
activities (e.g., compliance reviews, recertifications, risk
assessments). Random checks and tests ensure actual
implementations of appropriate procedures and that protective
measures do, in fact, reduce identified risk exposures to
acceptable levels.
(2) Security Incidents. Reported security incidents
should be tracked to determine trends, to identify general
problem areas and security needs, and to ensure implementation of
appropriate procedures and protective measures. The result
should be fewer incidents.
(3) Contingency Planning. Contingency and disaster
recovery plans provide overall protection when other safeguarding
features may have failed. Such plans should be in place and
periodically tested, at a minimum, for the most sensitive and
critical systems.
(4) CSAT. Managers should ensure that continuous CSAT
is conducted at DPI's, as appropriate.
C. DPI Reviews. Each DPI will conduct ongoing self-
assessment review activities to include CSAT, risk assessments,
and recertification reviews of applications supporting sensitive
or mission-critical functions to sustain optimal levels of
security.
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CHAPTER 3. CENTER AND DPI REQUIREMENTS
300 CENTER REQUIREMENTS
a. Designation of Authorities. In addition to the general
requirements of NMI 2410.7, Center Directors shall:
(1) Promulgate specific center policies, procedures,
and guidelines related to the general requirements of NMI 2410.7
and this Handbook, as deemed appropriate; and
(2) Designate, in writing, a management official
knowledgeable in both computing and computer security methods and
practices to be the CCSM.
b. CCSM Responsibilities. The CCSM shall serve as a focal
point to manage a program that is responsive to the Center
Director and coordinate activities required by NMI 2410.7 and
this Handbook between the HQ Automated Information Security
Program Manager and cognizant DPI's. In cases where multiple
DPI's exist, Assistant CCSM's may be designated to accomplish
specific center computer security responsibilities. The CCSM
responsibilities include:
(1) Implementing and coordinating an appropriate
management oversight process that ensures awareness and
compliance with the Center Computer Security Program.
(2) Assuring that each NASA and appropriate NASA
contractor DPI under his/her cognizance develops, implements, and
sustains an effective computer security program that ensures
awareness and compliance at the DPI level.
(3)' Scheduling and conducting periodic compliance
reviews at cognizant DPI's to assess the adequacy of security
plans, the sustained effectiveness of its computer security
procedures and program, and to make recommendations for
improvement, as appropriate. Compliance reviews should be
conducted every 1 to 3 years based on the reviewing management's
judgement. Factors to be considered in making this decision
include the reviewing management's perception of the sensitivity,
criticality, and/or value of the computing and information assets
to be protected at each DPI.
(4) Assuring that procedures are implemented for
identifying computer security incidents that occur at DPI's under
his/her cognizance. These procedures shall censure that
3-1
significant computer security incidents are reported to the HQ
Automated Information Security Program Manager immediately
following detection and that significant incident information
received from HQ is disseminated to cognizant DPI's. (See
paragraph 309 for a description of this procedure.)
(5) Assuring that, through the contracting officer,
all appropriate contractors comply with applicable provisions of
NMI 2410.7, this Handbook, and center computer security
directives.
(6) Coordinating all functional security requirements
with organizations/individuals having procurement, training, or
security-related responsibilities (e.g., those having
responsibilities in personnel security, physical security,
national (including defense-related) security, telecommunications
security, information security, internal management control,
auditing, quality assurance/control, administrative security,
emissions security, and operations security).
C.	 Identifying DPI's. As illustrated in Exhibits 2-4 and
3-1, the focus of implementing technical requirements begins at
the center and DPI levels. Center management is to ensure that
all NASA and appropriate NASA contractor computing and
telecommunication resources processing NASA information are
identified and included under the management of a DPI. A DPI is
established by drawing an imaginary boundary around a logical
grouping of information, computing, and telecommunications
resources for the purpose of managing those resources as an
identifiable entity. CCSM's are responsible for assuring that
9PI's have been identified. This is accomplished by negotiating
with organizations under the cognizance of center management to
determine the most logical approach. For example, DPI's might
represent logical groupings of information, computing, and
telecommunications resources within the boundaries of:
(1) A physical structure at a geographic location
(e.g., an entire building or a central computing
facility).
(2) An organizational structure (e.g., HQ or center
organizational codes).
(3) A combination of these approaches.
The grouping of computer systems for computer security
requirements should be consistent, if possible, with that used
for DPI's as defined in the . formation Technology System Plan
(ITSP) submitted annually by each NASA center.
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d. Identifying Additional Entities. DPI-CSO's are
responsible for determining if identification of additional
entities under the DPI is needed to more effectively manage and
coordinate aspects of the DPI computer security program. These
entities could represent logical groupings of information,
computing, and telecommunications resources associated with sub-
elements of the DPI organization, major hardware or software
configurations, or clusters of microcomputers.
301 DPI REQUIREMENTS
a. Designation of Authorities. Each NASA (or appropriate
NASA contractor) manager in charge of a NASA center shall assure
that a management official, knowledgeable in both computing and
computer security management methods and practices, is designated
as the DPI-CSO. Day-to-day securit- , responsibilities may be
delegated to technical support personnel. In cases where
multiple computer systems or program area applications exist,
CSC's may be designated to accomplish specific security
responsibilities.
DPI-CSO Responsibilities. (See Exhibit 3-2.) The DPI-
CSO in coordination with the appropriate CCSM shall:
(1) Implement and
administer a management
process appropriate to the DPI
environment to ensure that
sensitivity and/or criticality
of information is determined
by the application
sponsors/owners and that
appropriate administrative,
technical, physical, and
personnel protective measures
are incorporated into all new
and existing computer systems
and applications processing
sensitive or mission-critical
information to achieve and
sustain an acceptable level of
security. (See paragraph 302
for a description of this
management process.)
EXHIBIT 3-2
DPI-CSO RESPONSIBIMES
• Management Process
• Protection Planning
• Protection Control
• Contingency Planning
• Incident Identification
• Awareness do Training
• Coordination
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(2) Formulate, continually update, and annually review
a DPI computer security plan, which will allow the appropriate
approving (i.e., DPI) or reviewing (e.g., center and HQ Program
Office) authorities to judge the comprehensiveness and
effectiveness of the DPI computer security program. In cases
where multiple DPI's, computer systems, or program area
applications exist, multiple plans may be appropriate. The
planning process may also be integrated into center-level
planning activities as deemed appropriate by the CCSM. (See
paragraph 503 for a description of the required contents of a DPI
Computer Security Plan.)
(3) Develop and implement protective measures designed
to prevent misuse and abuse of computing resources. (See
paragraph 304 for a description of these protective neasures.)
(4) Develop and implement a process, as appropriate,
for providing contingency planning and reasonable continuity of
operations for computa:r systems and computer applications
supporting mission-critical functions. (See paragraph 308 for a
description of this process.)
(5) Develop and implement procedures in coordination
with taw CCSM for identifying computer security incidents and
reporting significant computer security incidents, as described
in paragraph 309.
(6) Assure that plans are developed and implemented
for conducting continuous CSAT to ensure that NASA and
appropriate NASA contractor personnel involved in managing,
designing, developing, or maintaining computer applications
processing sensitive or mission-critical information, end who use
computer systems, are aware of their security responsibilities
and know how to fulfill them. This includes being kept aware of
vulnerabilities and being trained in techniques to enhance
security. (See paragraph 310.)
(7) Coordinate all functional security require.:.jnts
with organizations/individuals having procurement, training, or
security-related responsibilities, e.g., those having
responsibilities in personnel security, physical security,
national ( including defense-related) security, telecommunications
security, information security, internal management control,
auditing, quality assurance, administrative security, emissions
security, and operations security.
302 MANAGEMENT PROCESS
The management process must ensure that the following, as a
minimum, are carried out (see Exhibit 3-3):
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EXHBfT 3.3
a. Risk Assessments.
Perir,dit': risk assessments must
be conducted for new and
existing DPl's to assure that
appropriate, cost-effective
protective m asur,:^s are
incorpora .,d and are
commensu. y with ache
sensitivi , .I, c: °iticality, and
value of associated computer
systems, computer
applications, and information
processed. (See paragraph 303
for a description of the risk
assessment process.)
I	 ^^ru^^a^rs^loc^sg:
• Risk Assessments
• Application Certification / Recertification
- Functional Security E quirements
- Seauity Spedflations
S~ty Design Reviews
Systsm Tests
Cortitication i Recertitladon
• Personnel Screening
• Access Control A Accountability
• Compliance Assurance
• Contingency Planning
-	 Dissater Recovery
Operations Continuity
• Approval of Methodok>'gies
b. Certifying Requirements. Procedures must be
established for defining functional security requirements,
developing technical security specifications, conducting security
design reviews and system tests, certifying and recertifying
computer applications processing sensitive or mission-critical
information at appropriate phases of the system life cycle, and
approving technical security specifications for the acquisition
of computing resources or related services. (See paragraph 305
for minimum functional security requirements and certification
pro^edures.)
C. Personnel Screening. Personnel who participate in
managing, designing, developing, operating, or maintaining
computer applications processing sensitive or mission-critical
information,. or who access automated sensitive or mission-
critical information, must be appropriately screened to a level
commensurate with the sensitivity, criticality, or value of the
information to be accessed or handled and the risk and magnitude
of loss or harm that could be caused by the individual. Federal
personnel are to be screened in accordance with the Federal
Personnel Manual, Section 732. Guidance on screening non-Federal
personnel is presented in paragraph 306.
d. Access Protection and Accountability. Appropriate
protective measures must be established, to the extent
economically and technically feasible, for maintaining personal
accountability zf individual users granted access to sensitive or
mission-critical information and for ensuring that they have
access to no more information than they are authorized to access.
e. Compliance Assurance. Followup procedures must be in
place to assure implementation of protective measures in
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accordance with recommendations from compliance review and
certification and recertification activities.
f. Contina,
disaster recovery
and maintained to
interruption, and
services should ai
operations.
ancv and Disaster Recovery Plans. Appropriate
plans and contingency plans must be established
prevent loss of information, minimize
provide reasonable continuity of computer
averse events occur that would prevent normal
g. ADVroval of A[gthodoloaies. Computer security planning,
risk assessment, and security certification methodologies shall
be approved by appropriate management officials.
303 RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS
a. NASA recognizes the importance of conducting risk
assessments as a basis for making informed management decisions
related to accepting identified risk exposures or implementing
appropriate cost-effective protective measures to reduce risk
exposures to acceptable levels. When used appropriately, risk
assessment is a very effective management tool. It should serve
to provide a systematic approach for:
(1) Determining the relative value, sensitivity, and
criticality of DPI information and computing
resources.
(2) Assessing potential threats and perceived risk
exposure levels.
(3) Identifying existing protective measures.
(4) Identifying and assessing additional protective
alternatives.
(5) Determining acceptability of identified risk
levels.
(6) Documenting the assessment process and resulting
management decisions.
b. Risk assessments may vary from an informal review of a
small-scale microcomputer installation to a formal, fully
documented analysis (i.e., risk analysis) of a large-scale
computer installation. Since risk assessments can involve many
disciplines and organi-4tions, a team approach is recommended,
regardless of the size of the systems being analyzed. A
tremendous amount of time and effort can be saved by bringing
together the right people with the needed knowledge and
3-7
experience to review concerns and make subjective judgements,
based on professional experience and knowledge.
C.	 DPI's should
continue to be given
flexibility for selecting
methodologies and
implementing risk assessment
programs that are most
appropriate for their
computing environments.
However, the risk assessment
process must ensure, at a
minimum, the following (see
Exhibit 3-4):
(1) A risk
assessment methodology is
selected (i.e., qualitative,
quantitative, or i,
combination of both) ~hat
includes the following
elements and logical steps,
as appropriate:
EXHORT 3-4
ENT Wr
1. Determine Scope
2 Identity A Value Hardware i Software Assets
3. Identity Information Assets
Dowmim SNaKlvap
Dawmkw Cralalky
DetwMk» Valw
Detwmins Pot*" Adwee knpws
4. Identity Existing Controls
S. Identity Threats S Estimate Risks
6. Analyze Casts 6 Benefits Of Potential Controls
7. Recommend Actions
& Document Actions
9. Folbwup Review
(a) Determination of Risk Assessment Scope. For
example, a risk assessment may consider an entire DPI, including
all hardware, software, and telecommunication aspects, or may be
limited to an assessment of an individual mainframe or
microcomputer system. Regardless of the approach, the scope of
the risk assessment should be planned and maintained within
manageable limits, and the level of effort should be commensurate
with the nature of the DPI being assessed. For example, a risk
assessment of a stand-alone microcomputer installation could be
done informally by the owner of the information.
(b) Asset Identification and Value.
Identification of major DPI assets and general approximations of
their current replacement value in order to establish a basis for
making informed decisions on protective measures as described in
subparagraph (g) below. For example, if it is known that the
approximate value of computing resources within the scope of the
risk assessment is about $1 million, it may make sense to spend
several hundred dollars or several thousand dollars to enhance
protective measures.
(c) Determination of Potential Impacts. General
determination of collective sensitivity, criticality, and/or
value of information processed or stored at th e DPI and potential
impacts if information is misused, altered, destroyed, or
disclosed. This determination should be based on an analysis of
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individual functional security requirements (which are prepared
by sponsor/owners) of computer applications processed.
(d) Identification of existing protective
measures (i.e., those already in place).
(e) Identification of existing and potential
threats and hazards and qualitative estimates of risk exposure
and/or quantitative calculations; for example, Annual Loss
Expectancy (ALE) associated with potential adverse events.
(f) Determination of acceptable risk exposures,
anti/or determination of alternative protective measures,
associated benefits, and associated costs needed to reduce
identified risk exposures and/or ALE to acceptable levels.
(g) Recommendations for szccepting risk exposures
and/or ALE's, or recommendations for	 appropriate
protective measures that are needed to improve security (reducing
risk exposure and/or ALE) based on an analysis of the ratio
between the estimated cost/benefit of proposed protective
measures and the value/sensitivity of information/computing
resources requiring protection. The cost of protective measures
should not normally exceed a reasonable percentage of the value
of assets requiring protection (as identified in subparagraphs
(b) and (c)).
(h) Documentation of actions taken or planned as
a result of the risk assessment findings and recommendations.
(i) Followup procedures to assure that all
actions planned have been carried out.
(2) Risk assessments are performed:
(a) Prior to construction or operational use of a
new DPI.
(b) Whenever there is a significant change to an
existing DPI.
(c) At periodic intervals, established by the
DPI-CSO, that are commensurate with the sensitivity or
criticality of the information processed by the DPI, but not to
exceed 5 years if no risk assessment has been performed during
that time.
(3) The selected risk assessment methodologies and
results are approved by appropriate management officials at the
center and DPI levels and taken into consideration when
certifying or recertifying computer applications prccessing
sensitive or mission-critical information.
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(4) Risk assessment results are available for
consideration during the evaluation of internal controls,
conducted in accordance with NMI 1200.7, "NASA's Internal Control
System," that apply to DPI's or computer applications processing
sensitive or mission-critical information.
304 PROTECTIVE MEASURES TO PREVENT MISUSE AND ABUSE
In addition to other appropriate protective measures (such
as those covered in Chapter 4), protective measures to preve }
misuse and abuse of computing resources should include the
following (see Exhibit 3-5):
a. Developing and
implementing a procedure,
where technically and
economically feasible, to
maintain automated
computer system logs of
access to multiuser
computer systems to
determine whether
unauthorized accesses are
being attempted.
EXHIBIT 3-5
• Access Log
• Random File Sampling
• Awareness Procedures
• Incident Response Procedures
b. Reviewing the contents of computer system files, by
means of random sampling, at unannounced intervals.
C. Developing and implementing awareness procedures
requiring all personnel who access computer systems to have a
working knowledge of computer security ethics, responsibilities,
policies, and procedures.
d. Ensuring that all actions constituting suspected or
confirmed significant computer security incidents are brought to
the immediate attention of the appropriate DPI-CSO; that the
extent and cause of any incident is determined; and that
reasonable steps are taken to minimize the probability of further
incidents including additional training, counseling, disciplinary
action, and/or notifying criminal investigative and law
enforcement authorities, as appropriate.
305 CERTIFICATION PROCESS
Certification is required to provide reasonable assurance
that a proposed or significantly changed computer application
that processes sensitive or mission-critical information meets
all applicable requirements and the original design
specifications and that installed protective measures are
adequate and functioning properly prior to operational use. The
3-10
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certification process should involve all those individuals who
have participated (or will participate) in the sponsoring,
planning, designing, programming, operation, and/or use of the
application. Since this process could involve many organizations
and individuals, a team approach is recommended. A
representative from each functional area should be responsible
for witnessing the system test and signing off on his or her area
of responsibility. The primary responsibility for accomplishing
certification tasks in coordination with the DPI-CSO should
reside within the sponsoring/data owner organization. The DPI-
CSO of the installation in which the application will be
processed should assure that the following process has taken
place prior to operational use:
a. New or Modified Applications. For new or significantly
changed computer applications that process level 2 through level
3 (as defined in Chapter 4) sensitive or mission-critical
information, assure that (see Exhibit 3-6);
(1) Functional
security requirements are
defined by the system
and/or information
sponsors/owners based on
established installation
procedures that include
the following:
(a)Identi-
fying and determining the
nature of the sensitivity
and/or criticality of
information to be
processed as discussed in
Chapter 4 of this
Handbook, and determining
how the information may
be vulnerable to
potential threats (e.g.,
misuse, alteration,
destruction, or
disclosure) ;
EXHIBIT 3-6
• Sponsor / Owner Requirements
Sensitivity, Criticality & Vulnerability
integrity, Availability & Confidentiality
Potential impacts
Acceptable Interruptions / Delays
Replacement Values
• Functional Security Requirements
• Technical Security Specifications
• Existing Risk Assessments
• Design Review & Systems Tests
• Certification Document
(b) DctL ::...zing primary and secondary system
security concerns (i.e., integrity, availability,
confidentiality);
(c) Determining potential impacts if sensitive or
mission-critical information is misused, altered, destroyed, or
disclosed (e.g., embarrassment, legal liability);
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(d) Determining when an application that supports
a mission-critical function must be back in operation after an
interruption to avoid adversely affecting the mission of the user
or the sponsoring/owner organization; and
(e) Determining general approximation of
replacement values associated with the application/information;
(2) System designers develop technical security
specifications that detail functional security requirements and
describe how specific protective techniques will be employed.
These specifications should be described in technical terms that
system developers and programmers can implement;
(3) Functional security requirements and technical
security specifications are reviewed and approved prior to
acquiring or starting formal development;
(4) Results of risk assessments performed at the DPI
in which the computer application will be processed are taken
into consideration when defining and approving technical security
specifications for computer applications;
(5) Security design reviews and system tests are
conducted and approved prior to operational use of computer
applications; and
(6) Upon successful completion of the system test, the
computer application is certified prior to operational use as
meeting requirements of documented and approved functional
security requirements, technical security specifications, and
related. DPI procedures, and that results of the system test
demonstrate that the application, computer system, and DPI
protective measures are adequate and functioning properly.
b.	 Recertifications. For operational applications
processing sensitive or mission-critical information assure that:
(1) Periodic reviews are conducted and
recertifica.tions are made of the continued adequacy and proper
functioning of protective measures;
(2) The recertification process takes into
consideration all available information (e.g., other reviews and
audits that may have been conducted subsequent to the last
certification); and
(3) Recertifications are conducted at least every 3
years, as appropriate. Time intervals should be commensurate
with the sensitivity/criticality of the information processed.
If no significant change has taken place and no deficiencies have
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been identified in other review activities, the recertification
process may be less stringent than the initial certification
process.
306 PROCEDURES FOR SCREENING NON-FEDERAL PERSONNEL
Based on requirements in OMB Circular A-130, this procedure
has been developed in coordination with the NASA Security Office
(HQ Code NIS), which has primary responsibility for establishing
policy relating to the screening of all NASA and appropriate NASA
contractor (i.e., non-Federal) personnel who participate in the
design, development, operation, or maintenance of automated
systems, or who access sensitive or mission-critical information.
The CCSM, in joint coordination with the Center Security Office,
should assure that proper procedures are in place for screening
non-Federal personnel.
a. Scope and Applicability
(1) This procedure provides guidance for the screening
of non-Federal personnel who are U.S. citizens and are being
granted access to NASA computer systems or the NASA
sensitive/critical information they process. For guidance on
protecting access by foreign nationals, see paragraph 307.
(2) This guidance need not apply to non-Federal
personnel who have or within the last 5 years received a NASA or
other Government agency access authorization (or classified
clearance) based on a favorable Government-conducted
investigation.
Access may be granted by the Center Security Office using an
adjudication process.
b. Objective. Personnel screening is to be conducted only
to determine an individual's eligibility, or continued
eligibility,'for access to NASA computer systems or the
sensitive/critical information he or she processes. Personnel
screening is not to be construed as a determination of
suitability for employment.
C.	 Screening Procedure
(1) The Center Security Office screens Federal
employees in accordance with OMB/OPM standards, which require the
designation of "position sensitivity levels" for all ADP-computer
positions. For screening non-Federal personnel, "position
sensitivity levels" are assigned to people, rather than
positions, since most non-Federal personnel do not have position
descriptions.
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(2) Each individual should be screened to a level
commensurate with the sensitivity or value of the information to
be handled and the risk and magnitude of loss or harm that could
be caused by that individual. In general, the level of
screening of a non-Federal employee will be influenced by the
sensitivity/criticality level of the system the employee will be
working on. See Exhibit 3-7 for screening levels.
(3) Personnel screening is a protective measure
generally applied based on assessments of other protective
measures already in place, potential risk exposures, cost and
benefits t- be derived, and feasibility of implementation.
Functional area managers/sponsors are responsible for designating
"position sensitivity levels" to non-Federal personnel. These
designations are then forwarded to the Center Security Office.
Based on the designated "position sensitivity level" of the non-
?ederal employee, the Center Security Office will make a
determination as to the level of screening required and begin the
screening process.
307 CONTROLLING ACCESS BY FOREIGN NATIONALS
a. Introduction. The NASA Office of External Relations has
primary responsibility for establishing NASA policy on
controlling access to NASA facilities by foreign nationals (i.e.,
all individuals wh3 are not citizens or nationals of the United
States). Refer to NMI 1371.3, "Coordination of Foreign Visitor
Activities," for additional information.
b. L>urpose. The following policy and procedure has been
developed from the perspective of the NASA AIS Program by the
Office of IRM in coordination with the Office of External
Relations. It sets forth NASA guidelines on controlling
electronic access by foreign nationals to NASA computer systems
that process sensitive or mission-critical information.
c. Categories. There are two basic categories of foreign
nationals that seek access to NASA computer systems: (1) those
hired by contractors to perform work tasks in the normal course
of business; and (2) those who seek access pursuant to
international partnership agreements to conduct work on major
multinational projects (e.g., Space Station). Foreign nationals,
under category (1) above, that are hired by contractors in the
normal course of business, need to be investigated and managed
much like other contractor employees. Foreign nationals, under
category (2) above, need to be managed consistent with
requirements that are negotiated into international partnership
agreements.
d. Sponsors. Requests for foreign national access to NASA
computer systems must be sponsored by a NASA or another
appropriate U.S. Government agency or contractor organization.
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EXHIBIT 3-7
SCREENING LEVELS FOR NON-FEDERAL EMPLOYEES
WORKING WITH COMPUTERS
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0 None
1 National Agency Check
2 National Agency Check
3 Background Investigation
'Refer to NHB 1610.6 NASA Personnel Security Handbook, Chapter 3 for a description of the
screening levels.
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e. Submission/ARRroval of Reauests. CCSM shall assure that
appropriate procedures are in place to evaluate requests for
foreign national access. Requests for foreign national access to
NASA computer systems are to be submitted through the appropriate
DPI-CSO (i.e., at the installation where primary access will
occur) to the Center Security Office for appropriate
investigation and approval. Requests for access by foreign
nationals from designated areas will he reviewed on a
case-by-case basis. Refer to Exhibit 3-8 for additiona,
guidance.
f. ExceRtions. Requests for foreign national access which
present unusual concerns, for a Center's Security Office should be
coordinated with the Headquarters Security Office, appropriate
Headquarters Program Office, and the Headquarters International
Relations Division (Code XIC) for further analysis and
concurrence.
308 CONTINGENCY AND DISASTER RECOVERY PLANNING
a. Definit
contingency plans
interruptions and
events occur that
activities may be
activities at the
ons. Disaster recovery plans for DPI's and
for applications shall provide for minimizing
reasonable continuity of services if adverse
prevent normal operations. These planning
integrated with each othe.- or other planning
discretion of the CCSM.
(1) Disaster Recovery Plan. Disaster recovery plans
are documents containing procedures for emergency response,
extended backup operations, and post-disaster recovery should a
DPI experience a partial or total loss of computer resources and
physical facilities. The primary objectives of these plans, in
conjunction with computer application contingency plans, are to
provide a reasonable assurance that a DPI can recover from such
incidents, continue to process mission-critical applications in a
degraded mode (i.e., as a minimum, process computer applications
previously identified as most critical), and return to a normal
mode of operation within a reasonable time. Such plans are a
protective measure genirally applied based on assessments of
other protective measurt,, already in place, potential risk
exposures, costs and benefits to be derived, and feasibility of
implementation.
(2) Contingency Plans. Contingency plans describe
procedures and identify personnel necessary to respond to
abnormal situations and ensure that computer application
sponsors/owners can continue to process important applications in
the event that computer support at the primary DPI is interrupted
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EXHIBIT 3-8
MINIMUM INFORMATION
FOR FOREIGN NATIONAL ACCESS REQUESTS
1. BACKGROUND DATA
•	 Personal
Full name.
Birthplace.
Current citizenship or country.
Social Security Number (if available).
•	 Permits
Passport number; place & date of issuance.
Visa number & type; place & date issued; expiration date.
Alien work permit, if applicable.
•	 Representation
Nr.tionality (Attach documentation).
U.S. Government Agency or NASA Center serving as sponsor (Attach
documentation).
2. NATURE OF REQUEST
•	 Hardware to be accessed
Specific computer system(s).
Specific termina l !nr!ation(s) [Complete address, street, city, state, and dial-in
access telephone number].
•	 Files / Applications to be accessed
File / Application names.
Level of requested access (READ-only, WRITE, EXECUTE).
File owner / Custodian (Name, title & organization) [Attach permission
documentation from the data owner and/or application Sponsor].
- Sensitivity levels of files, application systems, and computer systems.
•	 Access period requested
Commencement-to-end date (Month, day, & year).
Termination date (Month, day, & year).
Justification (For this particular period).
3. JUSTIFICATION FOR ACCESS
•	 Exact nature of assignment requiring access.
•	 Reasons why hard copy access Is insufficient.
4. SECURITY CONTROLS TO BE IMPLEMENTED / USED
•	 Physical access to facilities and hardware.
•	 File access (i.e., technical controls in the operating system).
•	 Physical, administrative, and/or online monitoring of the individual.
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(e.g., appropriate automated and/or manual backup capabilities
should be considered). These plans are developed in conjunction
with computer application or data sponsors/owners and aTe
maintained at the primary and backup data processing
installation.
b. Plan Content. Contingency and disaster recovery plans
for a DPI should include:
(1) Identification of applications support mission-
critical functions. This information should be derived from
functional security requirements developed by owners/sponsors.
(2) Potential impacts to the DPI should unnecessary
processing delays occur.
(3) When applications must be back in operation after
an interruption to avoid adversely affecting the critical
missions of the users or the sponsoring/owner organizations.
This information should be derived from functional security
requirements developed by owners/sponsors.
(4) The relative criticality of each application to
the overall mission of the local organization, the center, HQ
Program Office, or the Federal agency, and establishing
priorities to restore processing support in a logical fashion
after an interruption. The relative ranking of applications
should be based on recommendations from sponsor/owner
organizations and approved by DPI management.
(5) The appropriate amount of documentation. The
amount of documentation detailed in these plans should be
commensurate with the nature of the DPI (e.g., documented in more
detail for large complex DPI's supporting multiuser computer
systems and documented in less detail for small DPI's supporting
single-user computer systems).
(6) Test intervals and providing reasonable assurance
that recovery requirements can be met.
(a) Cont'-..gency plans for new applications should
be operationally tested at the supporting DPI during initial
system tests, and at time intervals commensurate with the
associated risk of harm or loss that could be experienced. It is
th, sponsor/owner organization's responsibility to ensure that a
DPI can meet specified functional security requirements. This
includes identifying and considering alternative processing DPI's
or providing additional funding to enhance protective measures at
the supporting DPI.
(b) Disaster recovery plans should be tested at
least annually using a cost-effective and reasonable approach.
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For example, a limited test based on sample test data from the
most critical applications normally provides meaningful results.
(c) Formal written agreements should be
established to ensure that sufficient processing capacity and
time will be available to meet the recovery requirements of
computer applications when backup processing at an alternate DPI
is considered necessary.
(7) Identifying key individuals and developing proper
emergency notification and response procedurep.
309 COMPUTER SECURITY INCIDENT RESPONSE (CSIR) CAPABILITY
a. Responsibilities. Each NASA and appropriate NASA
contractor DPI .<s responsible for establishing a CSIR capability.
The CCSM should serve as the primary management point-of-contact
and further designate technical support individuals to serve astechnical points-of-contact. The CCSM should maintain a listing
of all management and technical points-of-contact at DPI's under
their cognizance. It is important to formulate strategies and
approaches to minimize adverse affects from computer security
incidents. A documented, center plan for major incident
response, assigning specific responsibilities and including a
plan for interacting with the media, is an excellent starting
point.
b. Objectives. The following procedure has been developed
as a method for timely reporting of significant computer security
incidents, for determining the type of information to be
reported, and for appropriate follow-on activities after initial
notification of an incident. Reports of significant computer
security incidents will be used to alert NASA and appropriate
NASA contractor DPI's to computer system vulnerabilities,
unauthorized access to computer systems, and other problems that
could adversely affect any NASA or appropriate NASA contractor
site. Sharing incident information can result in vulnerabilities
being identified, computer security awareness being elevated, and
risk exposures being minimized. The timely reporting of
significant computer security incidents also selves to alert NASA
management to situations that might affect flight readiness or
receive adverse public attention.
C.
	 Procedure Elements. The following procedure provides
necessary steps for reporting significant computer security
incidents at DPI's that have implemented (or are in the process
of implementing) the NASA Automated Information Security Program.
Use of this procedure should be compatible with incident and
emergency response and reportinc procedures that may already be
in place.
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(1) Immediately after detection of a significant
computer security incident (i.e., an incident that could affect
other DPI's under the cognizance of the same center), the DPI-CSO
should notify the appropriate CCSM. If it is determined that the
incident could affect other NASA or NASA contractor installations
under the cognizance of the center, an immediate notification
should be sent to all appropriate technical points-of-contact.
The ultimate objective of this initial notice is to alert other
DPI's to potential problems that may impact them. The initial
notice should provide the following:
(a) A general description of what occurred.
(b) If appropriate, characterization of
perpetrator(s) thought to be involved (i.e.,
insider, outsider).
(c) What corrective actions are recommended, have
been taken, or are planned.
(2) If the CCSM determines that the incident is
significant at the center level (i.e., that it could represent
significant loss, affect mission readiness, affect other centers,
and/or attract public attention), the CCSM should:
(a) Immediately notify the NASA HQ Automated
Information Security Program Manager.
(b) Coordinate with all appropriate technical
points-of-contact who support the affected
constituencies (e.g., UNIX, VAX, MS-DOS,
Macintosh, etc.).
(c) Immediately notify the appropriate center
CCSM's, who should coordinate with their
affected constituencies.
(3) The CCSM, in consultation with the Center Security
Office and the DPI-CSO, as appropriate, should determine what
type of support (e.g., technical, Inspector General, local law
enforcement, FBI, legal, physical or personnel security,
classification, and/or public relations) is required. Names and
telephone numbers of persons contacted in these organizations
should be maintained and included in follow-on reports. Should a
classification review determine that an incident affects a
classified environment (and therefore, is itself classified), all
communications between the DPI, center, Center Security Office,
HQ Security Office, and NASA Automated Information Security
Program Manager must be through secure channels. (See Chapters
7, 8, and 9.)
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(4) After all applicable information has been
obtained, a written follow-on report should be forwarded, through
the same NASA channels, to the NASA Automated Information
Security Program Manager. This follow-on report should contain
the minimum information shown in ExhiLit 3-9.
(5) A copy of these significant computer security
incident reports should be retained by the CCSM and DPI-CSO. The
retention period for these records should be determined by the
CCSM. Factors to be considered in determining this retention
period include the need for availability of this information
during periodic security reviews, risk assessments, and trend
analysis activities.
(6) The NASA Automated Information Security Program
Manager will serve as the main point-of-coordination among NASA
center senior management, NASA HQ Program Offices, NASA senior
management, and external organizations.
(7) The center closest to the occurrence of a
significant computer security incident should assume a lead role
in developing accurate reports of related facts and coordinating
public releases of information with the local Public Relations
Office, the NASA Automated Information Security Program Manager,
and Headquarters Public Affairs, Code P.
d. Non-duty Hours Considerations. Current listings should
be maintained of emergency situations and designated NASA CSIR
management officials to be notified. The listing should be
complete with after-hours phone numbers and designated alternates
for each official. These procedures should be integrated, as
appropriate, with local procedures for after-hours incident
response. Emergency situations after-hours that require
immediate HQ involvement should be directed to the Goddard Space
Flight Center (GSFC) Emergency Console. Calls will then be
forwarded to the responsible management official.
310 COMPUTER SECURITY AWARENESS AND TRAINING (CSAT)
a. Continuous CSAT. Continuous CSAT is required at
centers and DPI's to sustain the effectiveness of the NASA
Automated Information Security Program. Employees who understand
their responsibilities, the need for security, and what they must
do to promote it are one of the best protections against computer
security incidents. Therefore, training should be provided on an
ongoing basis to employees and contractors, as appropriate. New
employees should receive awareness training during their initial
orientation. Refresher training should be offered at least
annually. Additional training will be required whenever there
are major changes in a computing environment or the protective
measures baseline.
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EXHIBIT 3-9
MINIMUM INFORMATION FOR FOLLOW-ON INCIDENT
REPORT CONTENT
1. DATE AND TIME OF INCIDENT
2. LOCATION OF INCIDENT: DPI and/or appropriate identification of
affected hardware and software.
3. NATURE OF THE INCIDENT
A. What caused the incident.
B. Characterization of perpetrators) thought to be involved (i.e., insider, outsider).
C. Sensitivity level of information Involved'.
4. EFFECTS OF THE INCIDENT
A. Organizational element affected.
B. What is af'-_-ted [e.g., computer center, hardware, communication networks,
software (including version number)).
5. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR PLANNED
6. TECHNICAL SUPPORT, LAW ENFORCEMENT, LEGAL COUNSEL,
SECURITY, CLASSIFICATION, AND PUBLIC RELATIONS CONTACTS
MADE, AS APPROPRIATE
7. WHAT IMPLICATION DOES THIS INCIDENT HAVE FOR OTHER SITES,
IF ANY, AND WHICH OTHER SITES HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED
8. RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE FOLLOWING
A. Assistance needed by the DPI.
B. Need to change or establish new policies and/or procedures.
C. Additional action that should be taken by higher authorities.
9. NAME AND TELEPHOi 7 NUMBER OF LEAD DPI-CSO
10. NON-DUTY HOUR ACTIONS, IF ANY
A. Time and name of NASA Duty Officer contacted.
B. Determinations made.
C. Actions taken.
For an incident involving NASA classified information, include the incident ranking (see Chapter 8).
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b. Multifaceted Approach. NA:A has a multifaceted
approach (e.g., top-down and bottom-up, internal and external
sources, etc.) to CSAT. It is believed that an effective LSAT
program must offer more to personnel than just an hour of
classroom training once a year or a limited selection from NASA-
sponsored training activities. The training should incorporate a
variety of instructional approaches and be appropriate for the
target audience. To this end, NASA sponsors many internal
security conferences, seminars, workshops, and meetings which are
considered part of the overall NASA CSAT Program. NASA
encourages personnel to seek both internal and external CSAT
sources to meet specific job-related needs. Sources available
include:
(1) Annual NASA-Specific Conference. The IRM Office
sponsors an annual computer security conference that is specific
to NASA computing environments. This conference provides a forum
for and promotes interaction among (NASA employee and NASA
contractor) computer security representatives from NASA HQ,
centers, and DPI's. It also facilitates the exchange of
technical and management information related to protecting
computer systems and automated information throughout the NASA
community.
(2) Annual CCSM Working Group Sessions. The IRM
Office sponsors at least two CCSM Working Group Meetings per year
for the purpose of bringing all CCSM's together to share current
information, solve common problems, and plan future NASA
Automated Information Security Program management strategies.
(3) NASA Electronic Computer Security Bulletin Board.
The IRM Office, with administrative support from the HQ Office of
Space Flight, sponsors a NASA bulletin board service on NASAMAIL
for the purpose of sharing current management and technical
information related to computer security within the NASA and the
NASA contractor community.
(4) Periodic Computer Security Highlight Articles.
The IRM Office publishes "IRM Highlights" on a weekly basis.
This publication contains timely articles on all aspects of IRM
and normally includes articles on computer security. Articles on
computer security are inade available on the NASAMAIL Computer
Security Bulletin Board. Centers are encouraged to disseminate
this inforration to cognizant DPI's or extract information to
enhance their own periodic publications that are disseminated to
raise security awareness of current issues.
(5) Ongoing DPI Training. CSAT is required to sustain
the effectiveness of the NASA Automated Information Security
Program. Flexibility is given to allow this training to be
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conducted in a manner that is cost-effective and appropriate for
a DPI. Some options include:
(a) Formal Classroom Training.
(b) Self-Instruction Courses.
(c) Computer-Assisted Instruction ( CAI).
(d) Movies (16 mm).
(e) Videotapes.
(f) Newsletters and Bulletins.
(6) Ongoing Training from External Sources. NASA and
NASA contractor personnel are encouraged to evaluate their
specific LSAT needs and seek additional generic and specialized
training from external sources (e.g., OPM, GSA, Department of
Agriculture Graduate School, DOD Computer Institute, National
Computer Security Center, and commercial vendors).
(7) Significant Incident Reporting (Feedback Loop).
Reports of significant incidents are used to alert other centers
and DPI's to potential threats and other problems that could
adversely affect their operations. Through the sharing of
incident information NASA management can be kept informed,
national trends can be determined, computer security awareness
can be elevated, and potential risk exposures minimized.
(8) Sharing of Security Tools and Techniques. The
NASA Automated Information Security Program establishes a network
of computer security contacts at all organizational levels.
Individuals at all levels are encouraged to establish
professional working relationships with their counterparts for
the purpose of improving communications and sharing effective
computer security tools and techniques. Such relationships are
vital to reduce burden, solve common computer security problems,
and provide effective response during significant incident
situations. The IRM Office encourages all centers to continually
submit effective management tools and technical techniques they
have developed for dissemination to other centers for evaluation
and implementation consideration.
311 PROCUREMENT OF PRODUCTS AND SERVICES
The Office of Procurement %Code H) has primary
responsibility for developing policy and guidance related to NASA
procurements. The following guidance has been developed by the
IRK Office from the NASA Automated Information Security Program
perspective in coordination with the Office of Procurement.
a.	 Introduction. Functional security requirements :rust be
developed by sponsors/owners to integrate appropriate security
protective measures into hardware, software, telecommunications,
or supporting contractor services. Also, detailed technical
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security specifications must be developed by designers. These
requirements (e.g., risk assessment, technical hardware/software
measures, design reviews, system tests, certification prior to
operational use, personnel screening, LSAT) must be included in
technical specifications and solicitations/contracts.
b. NASA Contracting Environment. Due to the nature of
NASA operations, NASA has virtually every type of contractual
situation for the acquisition of computer products and related
support services. Because of the diverse range of procurement
and contractual situations and the degree of management that may
exist between NASA and any given contractor, a reasonable
approach must be taken. Procurement and contractual situations
must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in order to avoid
imposing unnecessary constraints on contractors that are not
under the direct management of NASA.
C. Project Manager Responsibilities. The DPI management
official (e.g., the Project Manager or the Contracting Officer's
Technical Representative (COTR)) is responsible for assuring that
appropriate functional security requirements, technical security
specifications, and methods for evaluating security adequacy are
included in solicitation documents.
d. SRonsoring Organization Responsibilities. Functional
security requirements and technical security specifications shall
be developed and approved by sponsors of the acquisition and
reviewed by the designated DPI-CSO. General guidance for some
types of functional security requirements are included in GSA's
FIRMR. Other DPI-specific requirements will have to be developed
based on the protective techniques selected as the result of a
risk assessment and further guidance, which may be provided by
NASA procurement offices, GSA, and NIST. To the extent feasible,
functional security requirements should be stated in functional
terms (i.e., "what" is needed) relative to security objectives.
This will permit the DPI to benefit from new technology or an
innovative application of existing technology.
e. Contracting Officer Responsibilities. For the
procurement of computing resources or related support services,
contracting officers shall:
(1) Ensure that no action is taken on a request for
proposal. or procurement for computing resources or related
support services unless appropriate functional security
requirements and specifications are included in accordance with
established DPI procedures.
(2) Ensure that NASA technical proposal instructions
include a statement requiring a detailed outline and
demonstration of the offeror's computer security capabilities
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that comply with the functional security requirements of the
solicitation and contract.
(3) Include a clause in solicitations and contracts
requiring the contractor to comply with the _functional security
requirements set forth in applicable parts of NMI 2410.7 and this
Handbook.
f. Eyaluatina Security Capabilities. Proposal evaluators
shall review the offeror's proposed approach and witness live
test demonstrations, as appropriate, to evaluate the adequacy of
protective measures and the capability of the offeror to meet the
functional security requirements and technical security
specifications contained in the solicitation and contract.
Exceptions to live test demonstrations will be considered in
cases where it may be determined to be cost prohibitive.
Proposal evaluators shall then certify, if appropriate, the
adequacy of the offeror's compliance. This certification shall
be obtained by the contracting officer before proceeding with the
procurement.
g. Contract Administration. CCSM's and DPI-CSO's shall
conduct in coordination with their Contracting Officer, COTR, and
Project Managers, periodic reviews of contracts in progress to
ensure continued compliance with functional security
requirements. All instances of noncompliance shall be reported
to the Contracting Officer or designated representative.
h. Requirements for Contractor-Operated DPI'A. As
indicated in paragraph 102, the provisions of this Handbook apply
to support contractor organizations as provided by law and/or
contract, and as implemented by the appropriate contracting
officer. The center and DPI management processes should assure
that, in contracts for equipment, software, the operation of
DPI's, or related services:
(1) Appropriate functional security requirements and
specifications are included in procurement specifications and/or
statements of work.
(2) runctional security requirements and technical
security specifications are reasonably sufficient for the
intended application; that they comply with established DPI
procedures; and that protective provisions at the acquired DPI
are adequate and functioning properly prior to operational use.
(3) Resource-sharing service agreements provide for
compliance with applicable provisions of NMI 2410.7 and this
Handbook by responsible management officials at the acquired
processing DPI.
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CHAPTER 4. AUTOMATED INFORMATION CATEGORIES
AND SENSITIVITY/CRITICALITY LEVELS
400 INTRODUCTION
There are two important concepts covered in this Chapter.
The first concept is that there are reasonably definable
"categories" of information, each with its own unique management
and security concerns. The second is that once automated
information has been categorized, it is necessary to determine a
relative sensitivity and/or criticality level for that
information, so appropriate protective measures can be considered
and a protective measures baseline established for supporting
software, hardware, and telecommunication systems. The technical
depth of a risk analysis, type and frequency of security
awareness training, and the requirement for incident reporting
are all examples of areas where increasing sensitivity level
should cause increased emphasis and resource expenditures.
a.	 Information Categories. Information categories are
simply logical groupings of information that are based on a legal
requirement, a policy requirement, or a management concern to
treat a category of information in a particular way. An
understanding of these categories is the first step in
determining the nature of the sensitivity and/or criticality of
automated information and the types of protective measures that
may be appropriate when the information is processed by a
computer system or transmitted over a telecommunications network.
In order to assist application sponsors and information owners
with the sometimes subjective task of identifying the nature of
sensitive automated information and identifying automated
information that supports mission-critical functions, NASA has
developed a method for categoriz-4 ^_g automated information (--s
illustrated in Exhibit 4-1). All information falls into one or
more of these categories.
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EXHIBIT 4-1
NASA AUTOMATED INFORMATION CATEGORIES
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1 INFORMATION ABOUT Information related to personnel, medical, and similar information. All
PERSONS information covered by the Privacy Act of 1974 falls into this category.
2 FINANCIAL, Information related to financial information and applications, commercial
COMMERCIAL, AND information received in confidence, or trade secrets (i.e., proprietary). Also
TRADE SECRET included in this category are payroll automated decision -making
INFORMATION procurement, inventory, and other such financially-related systems.
3 NASA INTERNAL Information related to the internal operations of NASA. This category
OPERATIONS includes personnel rules, bargaining positions, and advance information
concerning procurement actions.
4 INVESTIGATION, Information related to investigations for law enforcement purposes.
INTELLIGENCE- intelligence-related information that cannot be classified, but is subject to
RELATED, AND SECURITY confidentiality, and extra security controls. Includes detailed security plans,
INFORMATION but does not include general plans, policies, or requirements.
5 OTHER FEDERAL Information that is required by statute or another Federal agency. This
AGENCY INFORMATION category includes information that is not the primary responsibility of NASA
6 UNCLASSIFIED NATIONAL National defense and intelligence -related information subject to the policy,
SECURITY-RELATED procedural, and protection requirements established under National Security
INFORMATION Decision Directive (NSDD)145 by the National Telecommunications and
Information Systems Security Committee.
7 NATIONAL RESOURCE Information related to the protection of a national resource (e.g., the Space
SYSTEMS INFORMATION Shuttle and related support systems).
8 MISSION-CRITICAL Information that has beer designated as critical to a NASA mission.
INFORMATION
9 OPERATIONAL Information that requires protection during operations. This is usually
INFORMATION time-critical information.
10 LIFE-CRITICAL Information critical to life-support systems (i.e., information whose
INFORMATION inaccuracy, loss, or alteration reasonably could be expected to result in loss
of life).
11 HIGH OR NEW Information relating to high or new technology prohibited'rom disclosure to
TECHNOLOGY certain foreign governments, or that may require an export license from the
INFORMATION Department of State and/or the Department of Commence.
12 OTHER UNCLASSIFIED Any information for which there is a management concern related to its
INFORMATION adequate protection, but does not logically fall into one or more of the above
11 categories . Use of this category should be rare.
13 CLASSIFIED NATIONAL Information classified for national defense purposes (i.e., under E-0. 12356).
SECURITY-RELATED
INFORMATION
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b. Sensitivity/Criticality Levels. NASA has established
four hierarchical "levels" of sensitivity/criticality to assist
application sponsors, information owners, system designers, and
system developers (see Exhibit 4-2). All automated information
falls into one of these four sensitivity/criticality levels, in
EXHIBIT 42
NASA UNCLASSIFIED AUTOMATED INFORMATION
SENSITIVITY / CRITICALITY LEVELS
• Would have a NEGLIGIBLE impact on NASA's missions, functions, Image,
or reputation. The Impact, while unfortunate, would be insignificant and
0	 almost unworthy of consideration; or
• Probably would NOT result in the loss of a tangible asset or resource.
• Would have a MINIMAL Impact on NASA's missions, functions, image, or
reputation. A breach of this sensitivity level would result in the least possible
significant unfavorable condition with a negative outcome; or
•	 Could result in the loss of SOME tangible asset or resource.
• Would have an ADVERSE impact actively opposed to NASA's missions,
functions, Image, and reputation. The impact would place NASA at a2 '	 significant disadvantage; or
•	 Would result in the loss of SIGNIFICANT tangible asset(s) or resource(s).
• Would have an IRREPARABLE impact permanently violating the integrity of
NASA's missions, functions, image, and reputation. The catastrophic result
3	 would not be able to be repaired or set right again; or
•	 Would result it :he loss of MAJOR tangible asset(s) or resource(s) including
posing a threat to human life.
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which each level has a generic set of protective measure
considerations (as illustrated in Exhibit 4-3). The following
paragraphs describe the 13 automated information categories, the
four sensitivity/criticality levels, and the protective measure
considerations for each level.
401 INFORMATION CATEGORIES
a. As shown in Exhibit 4-1, NASA has defined 13 categories
of information to facilitate managing automated information. The
predominant statutory bases for these categories are:
(1) Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act of 1982
(Public Law 97-255; 31 U.S.C. 66a).
(2) Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980
(Public Law 96-511; 44 U.S.C. 3501).
(3) Freedom of Information Act of 1974
(Public Law 93-502; 5 U.S.C. 552b).
(4) Privacy Act of 1974
(Public Law 93-579; 5 U.S.C. 552a).
b. Categories 1-5 are derived from the statutes indicated
above in subparagraph a and apply to all Federal agencies.
Category 6 is derived from guidance in NSDD 145. Categories 7-12
are derived from assorted Federal directives. Category 13 is
derived from Presidential Executive Order (E.O.) 12356. The
categories are defined in the following paragraphs.
(1) Information About Persons (Category 1). This
category includes information related to personnel, medical, and
similar information. All information covered by the Privacy Act
of 1974 falls into this category.
(2) Financial, Commercial, and Trade Secret
Information (Category 2). Category 2 includes information from
applications such as financial, procurement, inventory, and
decision making. It also includes commercial information
received in confidence, trade secrets, and proprietary
information.
(3) NASA Internal Operations (Category 3). This
incudes information related to the internal operations of NASA.
This category includes certain personnel rules, bargaining
positions, advance information concerning procurement actions,
etc.
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EXHIBIT 4-3
PROTECTIVE MEAS^_ ZE CONSIDERATIONS (Part 1)
LEVEL 1
PROTECTION
	 ``:
LEVEL 0
Conaldentlons (All level 0
CATEGORY wnsldontlons plus:)
User i andicallon and passwords to uniquely Physical, proor,Jural, or technical controls that
idenlitly each parson. allow physical "or logical control over
Mrrirttain log of at amasses to multi-user authorization for and access to the system and
systems. processing resources.
ACCESS CONTROL
Catalog of all filet. A configuration management process thatCONFIGURATION
^	 for all software used. controls changes to any security-related andM"NAGEMENT sensitive software, hardware, or procedure for
the system.
At least one generation ^1 backup application At least two generations of backups with theBACKUP COPIES software. Monthly backups of changed data oldest generation being stored at a locationOF files. other than the immediate vicinity of the system.
Physical security required when the computing Systems physically protected to prevent
PHYSICAL resources are unattended. unauthorized access, theft, or destruction.
ACCESS Physical key locks for microcomputerfixedthard disks. Separate locks should also
be used to prevent hardware theft.
Passwords required to access any network.
NETWORK ACCESS When doing file transfers, errorchecking/correction software required.
All users trained in automated applications National Agency Check (NAC) Screening.
PERSONNEL SECURITY they use, proper software handling procedures,
and basic computer security.
Proper dust, water, temperature, humidity, andENVIRONMENTAL ventilation controls required. Also, powerCONTROLS surge protection required.
STORAGE Proper storage bins or containers required for
MEDIA data storage media.
COMMUNICATIONS Communications links will be approved by the
responsible CCSM(s) prior to implementation.
AUDIT TRAILS
LOGOFF / TIME OUT
FEATURES
DATA BASE
MANAGEMENT
SYSTEMS
INFO & APPLICATION Random unannounced reviews of system files.
PROTECTION
CONTINGENCY/ Contingency and Disaster Recovery Plans
DISASTER should be developed in accordance with
RECOVERY PLAITS paragraph 308.
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EXHIBIT 4-3
PROTECTIVE MEASURE CONSIDERATIONS (Part 2)
LEVEL: OF8ENSmvmrr
AUTY LEVEL 2 LEVEL 3(AIL level 0 and 1 (All level 0.1. and 2
PROTECTION considerations plus:) considerations plus:)CATEGORY
Protection measures that allow for: Controls that can at all times restrict and lop
•	 Identification and authentication of individual user access by system resource,
individual users: application, and data files. Authordsition b
access system resources, applications, and
ACCESS CONTROL '	 Pasttiction of functional capabilities of data files must be com.,Ymed by theindividual users; sponsors/own m.	 (reconfirmation every 6
•	 Users to control access of other individual months).
users to their data and applications; and
•	
Data encryption. Non-use of encrypt- i justified.
Controls are in . ,'ice that allow data bases to
CONFIGURATION be stored off-lire.
MANAGEMENT
BACKUP COPIES
OF SOFTWARE
PHYSICAL
ACCESS
On Selected Systems: Written consent. identitying Written consent, identifying other network node
NETWORK ACCESS Other network nodes authonzed to access the authorized to access the system node obtainedsystem node obtained from the responsible from the responsible DPI-CSO prior to enabling
DPICSO prior to enabling any network connection. an network connection.
PERSONNEL SECURITY National Agency Check Screening Background Investigation (BI) Screening
ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTROLS
STORAGE
MEDIA
A well-defined/described path for the Initial user No uncontrolled dial-up access or unauthorized
COMMUNICATIONS identification and authentication processes. rannections to external networks.
Data encryption on selected systems. Non-use of encryption justified.
System generation of journals or audit logs, of
AUDIT TRAILS access to the system and to information and
applications at the individual user level.
System l goff of ,work stations that have not
LOGOFF / TIME OUT been in communication with the Central
FEATURES Processing Unit (CPU) for a period of time
determined by installation management.
Systems to provide for the integrity,
DATA BASE confidentiality, and availability of all information
MANAGEMENT resident in the data base The data base
SYSTEMS administrator is responsible for ensuring that
sponsors/ownen are informed and concur in
all defined access privileges to and uses of
the ir information.
INFO & APPLICATION Sons" lave1 indicators well be associated
PROTECTION with all system resources, information. and
applications at all times.
CONTINGENCY/
DISASTER
RECOVERY PLANS
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(4) Investigatory, Intelligence-Related, and Security
Information (Category 4). This category includes information
related to police intelligence and/or law enforcement
investigations nr informants. It also includes some computer
security infon,,a^.ion (such as detailed security plans for the
protection of systems and specific automation vulnerabilities).
Note that this category does not include general plans, policies,
or requirements, nor does it include Federal or national security
intelligence information.
(5) Other Federal Agency Information (Category 5).
Other Federal agency information includes information whose
gathering and/or maintenance is required by statute or another
Federal agency. Information in this category is not the primary
responsibility of NASA. For example, this category would include
DOD or Department of Energy (DOE) information processed in NASA
computers for DOD or DOE, respectively.
(6) Unclassified National Security-Related Information
(Category 6). This category includes national defense and
Federal intelligence-related information subject to the policy,
procedural, and protective requirements established by the
National Telecommunications and Information Systems Security
Commit':ee (NTISSC). This information may require protection in
addition to that required under NASA guidance. This information
is not classif19ble under E.O. 12356, but requires protection in
accordance with NTISSC policy.
(7) National Resource System Information (Category 7).
This is information related to the protection of a national
resource (such as the Space Shuttle or the Space Station
Freedom.)
(8) Mission-Critical Information (Category 8). This is
information tha-c has been designated as critical to the NASA
mission.
(9) Operational Information (Category 9). This is
information that requires protection during operations. It is
usually time-critical information.
(10)Life-Critical Information (Category 10). This is
information critical to life support systems (.e., information
whose inaccuracy, loss or alteration reasonably could be expected
to result in loss of life).
(11)High or New Technology Information (Category 11).
This is information relating to high or new technology prohibited
from disclosure to certain foreign governments or may require an
export license from the Department of State and/or the Department
of Commerce.
1
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(12) Other Unclassified Information (Category 12).
This is any information that does not logically fall into one or
more of the 11 categories and that is not classified for national
security purposes. Use of this category should be very rare.
(13) Classified National Sezurity-Related Information
(Category 13). This is information classified for national
security purposes (i.e., under °.O. 12356)= All computer
security actions related to this category are covered in Chapters
7, 8, and 9 of this Handbook.
402 SENSITIVITY/CRITICALITY LEVELS
a. Introduction,. The se:::.itiv ity levels defined in
Exhibit 4-2 are based on the amount of harm or loss that could be
experienced from an adverse event that affects the availability,
integrity, or confidentiality of NASA computing or information
resources. A hypothetical relationship between the automated
information categories and sensitivity/criticality levels is
presented in Exhibit 4-4 for general guidance onls. Detailed
analyses should be conducted by information sponsors and owners,
on a case-by-case basis, and should be reviewed by a DPI-CSO
before making any final sensitivity and/or criticality
e—terminatic"n. The sensitivity/criticality of automated
i.; ormation s'iould also be periodically re-evaluated, as the
influencino factors change.
b. Automated Information and Applications. The
sensitivity and/or criticality of automated information is
determined by applicable sponsors and information owners. A
sensitivity and/or criticality level should also be assigned to
each automated application, based on the sensitivity and/or
criticality of the automated information the application will
process. The sensitivity/criticality level of an automated
application . is at least as high as the most sensitive/critical
automated information that will be processed by that application.
The internal formulas or the information editing criteria in the
application source code could raise the sensitivity/criticality
level of the application even higher than the information it
handles.
C.	 Computer Systems. DPI-LSO's should assign each NASA
computer a sensitivity/criticality level, based on the
sensitivity/criticality level of the applications processed on
_ach computer system. Each computer system should have a
sensitivity/criticality level that is at least as high as that of
the most sensitive/critical application. processed. However,
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EXHIBIT 4-4
CATEGORIES AND SENSITIVITIES
INFORMATION MINIMUM SENSITIVITY LEVEL
CATEGORY TITLE 0 1 3
1 Personal
2 Financial, Commercial, and Trade •
Secret
3 NASA Internal Operations
4 Investigatory, Intelligence-related,
and Security
5 Other Federal Agency
6 Unclassified National Security- •Related
7 National Resource Systems
8 Mission-Critical
9 Operational
10 Life-Critical
11 High or New Technology
12 Other Unclassified
NOTE: Category 13, Classified Information, is Cove r9d in Chapters 7 through 9.
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significant replacement costs, unusually large numbers of
applications supported, and/or an unusually large volume of
information processed can raise the sensitivity/criticality level
of a computer system even higher than the sensitivity/criticality
level of tht most sensitive/critical application processed on
that system.
403 PROTECTIVE MEASURE BASELINE CONSIDERATIONS
Protective measure considerations for each sensitivity
and/or criticality level are presented as general guidance in the
following paragraphs. The selection or omission of protective
measures should be justified and based on the results of a risk
assessment. DPI's may elect to increase their protection, add
additional protective measures, or establish a mandatory minimum
protective measures baseline, as they deem appropriate. (See
Exhibit 4-3. Also, see paragraph 304.)
a.	 Sensitivity/Criticality Level 0. Sensitivity level
systems should provide for adequate protection of information
through the following protective measures:
(1) Access Protection. Whenever a single computer
system is used by more than one person (whether or not that use
is concurrent), physical, procedural, and technical protective
measures should be provided that allow for identification and
authentication of individual users and to prevent access by
unauthorized persons.
(2) Configuration Management. All files should be
cataloged and there should be licenses for all software used.
(3) Back-up Copies of Software. At least one
generation of backup software should be maintained. Backups of
changed information files should also be maintained.
(4) Physical Access. Physical security (such as door
locks and cable locks) should be required when the automated
information resources are unattended.
(5) Personnel Security. All users of computer systems
should be trained in the automated applications they use, proper
software handling procedures, and basic computer security
practices.
(6) Environmental Measures. Proper environmental
measures (to minimize the impacts of dust, water, temperature,
humidity, and ventilation) should be required. Also, power surge
protection should be required for hardware.
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(7) Storage Media. Proper storage bins or containers
should be required for information storage media (e.g., disks,
tapes, etc.).
(8) Communications. The communications links
connecting the computer system to other systems, networks,
workstations, or terminals should be approved by responsible
management prior to the implementation of the connection.
b. Sensitivity/Criticality Level 1. Sensitivity level 1
systems should provide all Sensitivity level 0 protective
measures as well as:
(1) Access Protection. Physical, procedural, or
technical protective measures should be provided that allow
physical and/or logical management of authorization and access to
the system and processing resources.
(2) Configuration Management. A configuration
management process should be developed and maintained that
monitors changes to any security-related and sensitive software,
hardware, or procedure for the system.
(3) Back-up Copies of Software. At least two
generations of back-ups should be maintained, with the oldest
generation being stored at a location other than the immediate
vicinity of the system.
(4) Physical Access. Systems should bz physically
protected to prevent unauthorized access, thef^_ cr destruction.
Physical Key locks should be used on microcompute r fixed/hard
disks. Separate physical locks should also be used to prevent
hardware theft.
(5) Network Access. Passwords should be required for
access to or from any network. Use of software that provides
error checking and some error correction capability should be
required when performing file transfers using networks.
(6) Contingency and Disaster Recovery Plans.
Contingency Plans for applications and Disaster Recovery Plans
for computer installations should be developed to provide for
minimal interruptions and reasonable continuity of services.
These plans should be developed in accordance with paragraph 308.
C.
	
Sensitivity/Criticality Level 2. Sensitivity level 2
systems should implement the protective measures required for
sensitivity levels 0 and 1, in addition to the following:
(1) Access Protection. Physical, procedural, and
technical protective measures should be provided that allow for:
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(a) Restriction of the functional capabilities of
individual users.
(b) Ability for individual users to manage access
(e.g., read, modify, or delete) by other
individual users to their information and
applications.
(c) Consideration of encryption of stored data.
(2) Audit Trails. The system should provide for the
generation of journals, or audit logs, of accesses to the system
and to information and applications at the individual user level.
Access to journals and audit logs should be restricted to a
well-defined group of users authorized by DPI management.
(3) Communications. All communication paths for the
system should be described, and a well-defined path should exist
for the initial user identification and authentication processes.
Encryption of data to be transmitted should be evaluated by
sponsors/owners.
(4) Network Access. written consent, identifying
other network nodes authorized to access the system node, should
be obtained from responsible DPI management prior to enabling any
network connection or interconnection.
(5) Logoff/Time Out Features. The system should
logoff work stations that have not been in communication with the
CPU for a period of time determined by DPI management.
(6) Data Base Management Systems (DBMS's). DBMS's
should provide for the integrity, confidentiality, and
availability of all information resident in the data base.
Individuals responsible for data base administration are
responsible . for ensuring that information owners are informed of
and concur in all defined access privileges to and uses of their
information.
d.	 ,gensitivity/Criticality Level 3.	 Sensitivity level 3
systems should implement the minimum protective measures required
for sensitivity levels 0, 1, and 2, in addition to the following:
(1) Access Protective Measures. Access protective
measures should be provided that can at all times restrict and
log individual user access by system resource, application, and
information files. Authorization to access system resources,
applications, and information files must be confirmed by the
information owners and shall be reconfirmed periodically, but at
least every 6 months.
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(2) Information and application Labels. Sensitivity
level indicators should be associated with computing resources,
applications, and information while Level 3 sensitive information
is being processed.
(3) Configuration Management. Protective measures
should be in place to allow data bases to be stored offline.
(4) Communications. There should be no uncontrolled
dial-up access or unauthorized connections to external networks.
Management decisions not to use data encryption should be
justified. Threats and risks associated with connections to
wide-area and/or internationally linked networks shall be
evaluated by sponsors/owners, and the resulting management
decisions should be justified.
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CHAPTER 5. COMPUTER SECURITY PLANNING
500 INTRODUCTION
This Chapter presents details of the required computer
security planning activities. Specifically, it covers the NASA
Automated Information Security Program Plan, the NASA HQ Program
Office Computer Security Plan (PO-CSP), the Center Computer
Security Plan (CCSP), the DPI Computer Security Plan (DPI-CSP),
and Contingency Plans. A discussion of how NASA complies with
external requests for planning information is found in paragraph
505.
501 HEADQUARTERS COMPUTER SECURITY PLANNING
a. NASA Automated Information Security Program Plan
(1) Scope. The NASA Automated Information Security
Program Plan is agencywide in scope. It does not provide
detailed planning information for any particular center, computer
system, or automated application. However, it documents goals,
objectives, agencywide program management strategies, agencywide
computer security awareness and training strategies, and
approaches for conducting management reviews to ensure optimal
levels of security are sustained.
(2) Purpose. The purpose of the NASA Automated
Information Security Program Plan is to document the overall NASA
Automated Information Security Program goal, objectives,
directions, and strategies for the NASA Automated Information
Security Program Manager.
(3') Manager. The NASA Automated Information Security
Program Manager is responsible for developing, implementing,
monitoring, and evaluating this plan.
(4) Distribution. The NASA Automated Information
Security Program Plan shall be distributed to all NASA CCSM's and
PO-CSM's.
(5) Publication Date. The NASA Automated Information
Security Program Plan shall be revised annually and published by
October 1.
(6) Period Covered. The NASA Automated Information
Security Program Plan details the computer security
accomplishments of the past fiscal year, as well as the plans for
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the current budget year plus one. Thus, it covers a total of 3
years.
(7) Relationship with Other Flans
(a) The NASA Automated Information Security
Program Plan provides input for national computer security
submission requirements from OMB and NIST. PO-CSP's, CCSP's, and
DPI-CSP's should operate within the NASA Automated Information
Security Program goal and objectives, as defined in the NASA
Automated Information Security Program Plan.
(b) Major security activities reported in the
Program Office and center computer security plans should be
reflected in the NASA Automated Information Security Program
Plan.
EXHIBIT 54
(8) Content and
Format. The content and
format for the NASA Automated
Information Security Program
Plan is shown in Exhibit 5-1.
• MANAGEMENT SUMMARY
• Background
History
• CURRENT SITUATION
• FUTURE STRATEGIES
b. Program Office Computer Security Plan (PO—CSP)
(1) Program Offices are designated for agencywide
programs. Many of these programs use computers and/or computer
applications at NASA centers. PO-CSM's must ensure that HQ PO-
CSP's address this use. PO-CSP's should be coordinated with
appropriate center and DPI level CSP's to assure consistency.
(2) The PO-CSP should provide overall direction for
computer security planning and adequate management summary
information to support management oversight functions that assure
appropriate security of all program office automated information
resources. The content should be consistent with and provide
input for the NASA Automated Information Security Program Plan.
PO-CSP's may reference more detailed information found in other
Program Office, center, or DPI plans. Actual computer security
planning activities should be integrated into the more
traditional planning activities, to the extent feasible, at
Program Offices, centers, and DPI's.
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i(3) PO-CSP's should be updated annually and copies
forwarded to the NASA Automated Information Security Program
Manager by July 15.
502 CENTER COMPUTER SECURITY PLANNING
a. Center Computer Security Plan (CCSP)
(1) Scope. A computer security plan is needed for
each NASA center.
(2) Purpose. The purpose of the CCSP is to sum,larize
the status ani direction of computer security activities
throughout the center and at DPI's under the cognizance of the
center. The intent is•not to repeat details already documented
in each DPI-CSP, but to integrate these plans into one
consolidated document enabling DPI managers to plan for major
computer security activities, to resolve inter-DPI conflicts and
inconsistencies, and to provide overall computer security
oversight and coordination at the center level.
(3) Manager. The CCSM is responsible for the
development and maintenance of a computer security plan covering
all automated information resources under the management or
oversight of his or her center.
(4) Distribution. A copy of the CCSP should be sent
to the NASA Automated Information.Security Program Manager by
July 15, but its primary use is for center managers.
(5). Publication Date. The CCSP shall be
updated/revised annually and published by July 1.
(6) Period Covered. Computer security plans for NASA
centers should comprehensively cover computer security activities
over a 3-year period (prior year through current budget year plus
one) .
(7) Relationship with Other Plans. Center emergency
response plans should reflect the security activities in the
CCSP. The CCSP should incorporate, in summary form, information
from all DPI-CSP's under the management.or oversight of the
center. In case-of differences between a PO-CSP and a CCSP, the
CCSP shall take precedence. If a PO-CSP requires more security
than provided by the CCSP, the sponsoring PO shall be responsible
for providing additional funding to meet such requirements.
However, PO-CSP's must at least meet minimum . baseline security
requirements of a CCSP.
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b. Content and Format. The level of detail in the CCSP is
determined by the complexity and scope of the center ' s automated
information resources. A sample format is shown in Exhibit 5-2.
(1) Introduction and Overview. The "Introduction and
Overview" paragraph should define the Center Computer Security
Program environmental context. This might include:
(a) Identifying those constraints that may impact
the implementation of the overall Center
Security Program.
(b) Describing the management structures,
relationships, and personnel (DPI-CSO's,
information owners and users, application
sponsors, working groups, committees, etc.)
that have responsibilities for the
implementation and maintenance of the Center
Computer Security Program.
(c) Describing the management processes
established to ensure that DPI activities are
carried out in a timely and complete fashion.
(2) Center Computer Security Program Goal and
Objectives. The CCSP should have a paragraph clearly defining
the Center Computer Security Program goal and objectives.
(3) Major Computer Security Activities
(a) The "Major Computer Security Activities"
paragraph should describe all significant computer security
activities over the 3-year period. Each activity could be
related to the computer security goal and objectives defined
earlier. For each year in the 3-year period, centers could cover
specific activities with actual or anticipated completion dates.
(b) These activities should be consistent with
those shown in the applicable DPI-CSP ' s. However, they would
appear here in summary form only. Specific activities might
include, but are not limited to:
(1) Risk Management.
($) Application Certifications.
($) Management Reviews.
(^) Computer Security Training.
($) Personnel Screening.
(^) Network Security.
(^) Contractor Security.
($) Major Incident Resolutions.
($) Conferences.
(^Q) Reporting Problems.
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EXHIBIT 5-2
CENTER COMPUTER SECURITY PLAN
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
2. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
3. GOALS (NOTE: These are center-wide computer security program goals)
4. OBJECTIVES
5. COMPUTER SECURITY ACTIVITIES(NOTE: Each activity should list which computer security goals and
objectives It supports.)
a. Prior Year Accomplishments
b. Current Budget Year Activities
c. Current Budget Year Plus One Activities
6. COMPUTER SECURITY ACTIONS REQUIRING COORDINATION WITH
OTHER CENTERS, NASA HEADQUARTERS, OR OTHER FEDERAL
AGENCIES
7. OTHER COMMENTS
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(e) Where possible, centers could identify the
financial and personnel resources needed to support the computer
security activities. These needs could include NASA personnel,
contractual support, and personnel training. When funding is
endemic to the development, operation, or maintenance of computer
systems or automated applications, centers could estimate the
percentage of that funding that is (or will be) directed toward
computer security activities.
503 DPI COMPUTER SECURITY PLANNING
a. Purpose. The purpose of the DPI-CSP is to provide a
document that serves as the management summary of more detailed
information that may be associated with the basic elements of the
DPI's computer security program. It should serve as a basis for
informing management of security needs, performing security
assessments, performing management and compliance reviews, and
facilitating the extraction of summary information in response to
center, HQ, or other Federal agency requests for planning
information. The extent to which this planning activity is
integrated into the center planning activities is left to the
discretion of each CCSM; however, a DPI must comply with the
center's CSP.
b. Content. The DPI-CSP must be kept current and should
include elements that are relative to the coverage of the plan
and to the computing environment c - the DPI, as follows (see
Exhibit 5-3):	 EXHIBIT 5-3
(1) Summary of the
management process describing the
general administrative, technical,
physical, and personnel protective
measures employed at the DPI. If
special provisions apply to
selective computer systems or
applications, this information
should be included.
(2) Reference to list(s)
that uniquely identify computer
applications that process sensitive
or mission-critical information,
the sponsors and/or owners of such
applications, and the computer
systems that provide processing
support.
DPI COMPUTER SECURITY >I
PLAN ELEMENTS
• Current Controls
• Application Sensitivities
• Contingency Plans
• Actions Schedule
• Review Results
• Awareness & Training
• Security Tools
• Incident Identification
• Security Contacts
5-S
(3) Reference to contingency and disaster recovery
plans.
(4) Reference to schedules indicating planned and
completed risk assessments, certifications /recertifications,
compliance reviews, and CSAT sessions. Schedules should, at a
minimum, indicate the fiscal year planned for such tasks.
(5) Reference to documents containing the results of
the latest compliance reviews, risk assessments, security design
reviews, system tests, certifications /recertifications, and
followup actions on previous recommendations from these review
activities.
(6) Reference to a plan for continually providing CSAT
to personnel who manage, design, develop, operate, maintain, or
use computer systems. Plans for off-site users may be less
specific and describe approaches for disseminating security
awareness and training information (e.g., online tutorials and
security bulletins).
(7) Identification of software tools used to enhance
security.
(8) Reference to the procedures for identifying
computer security incidents and reporting significant incidents.
(9) Reference to lists of key personnel and how they
can be contacted during emergencies. Key personnel may include
but are not limited to:
(a) The DPI-CSO.
(b) Assistant DPI-CSO's.
(c) CSC's.
(d) ComputLr security incident response
personnel.
(1) DPI management.
(2,) Operations.
(^) Technical support.
(4) Information sponsors/owners/users.
(e) Physical emergency response personnel.
( .1) Building maii:tenance.
(2,) Building protective services.
(,I) Fire department.
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504 DPI CONTINGENCY AND DISASTER RECOVERY PLANS
Contingency and Disaster Recovery Plans are covered in
paragraph 308.
505 EXTERNAL REQUESTS FOR REPORTS ON PLANNING ACTIVITY
a. NASA is subject to ongoing requests for reports of
computer security planning activity from such external agencies
as OMB, KIST, NSA, GSA, and GAO. To reduce management burden and
administrative: paperwork, detailed documentation (related to the
basic elements of computer security planning) should be
maintained at the lowist organizational levels. This information
should be stored in ways that make it easily located, extracted,
analyzed, and formatted.
b. Exhibit 5-4 illustrates the relationship of all NASA
computer security planning activities. The flow of planning
information (from general requirements to specific security
information) provides a master directory and cross-reference
system for locating detailed documentation on any specific aspect
of the agencywide CSP. This systematic approach eliminates the
need to retain multiple copies of documents at DPI, center, and
Headquarters levels. However, this structure requires that:
(1) The NASA Automated Information Security Program
Plan references more detailed information contained in HQ Program
Office and center computer security plans.
(2) The Program Office and center plans reference more
detailed information contained in DPI-CSP.
(3) The DPI-CSP references more detailed information
in computer system-level documentation.
C. An example of an external request is documented in OMB
Bulletin 88-16, issued July 6, 1988. OMB Bulletin 88-16 required
computer systems that processed sensitive information to be
identified by drawing logical boundaries around major application
support systems and/or general hardware support systems, based on
thi similarities among functional security requirements and
options. NASA is able to comply with such requests using
existing organizational structures (i.e., HQ Program Offices,
centers, and DPI's) and consolidating information contained in
existing documentation (at all levels).
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EXHIBIT 5-4
RELATIONSHIPS AMONG COMPUTER SECURITY PLANNING ACTIVITIES
I PLANNING REQUIREMENTS I
MANAGEMENT SUMMARY INFORMATION F-
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CHAPTER 6. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR MICROCOMPUTERS
600 INTRODUCTION
a. Security Principles. All the computer security
policies, standards, responsibilities, guidelines, principles,
and techniques covered in Chapters 1 through 5 apply to
microcomputers. However, the application of those policies,
standards, responsibilities, guidelines, principles, and
techniques can vary dramatically.
b. Security Implications. Microcomputer characteristics
result in security implications not normally found on mainframes:
(1) The increased use of microcomputers on networks
has exposed them to external threats.
(2) Microcomputer operating systems have few, if any,
security features designed into them.
(3; Most users do not understand the protective
measures available for microcomputers.
(4) Microcomputers normally operate in office areas
and are, therefore, accessible to most employees.
(5) Microcomputers are easy to move, and therefore can
be easily stolen. In addition, moving a microcomputer can damage
it internally.
(6) Most users do not understand that protective
measures are necessary to safeguard the valuable data, and not
just the loss of the computer hardware.
601 SPECIAL PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR MICROCOMPUTERS
The following p-ragraphs identify security implications of
microcomputers that require special protective measures.
a. lg;hnical Protective MeasurS2. The following technical
protective measures for microcomputers are available as software
or hardware add-ons:
(1) Sensitive informatics encryption.
(2) Computer access control using passwords.
(3) Erased disk area overwrite.
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(4) Disk backup.
(5) Deleted files retrieval.
(6) Authorized program execution control.
b.	 Administrative Protective Measures. The following
administrative protective measures are available for
microcomputers:
(1) Virus-free microcomputer input verification.
(2) Licenses for all software purchased for use.
C. Physical Protective Measures. The following physical
protective measures are available for microcomputers:
(1) Keyboard lock.
(2) computer tie-down device.
(3) Diskette storage cabinet.
(4) Re^.aovable hard disk.
(5) LoQkii.,le office or enclosure.
d. kersonnel__ELotective Measures. Personnel security for
microcomputers might include:
(1) User Security Awareness and Training.
(2) Employee Screening and Monitoring.
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APPENDIX B. ABBREVIATIONS
Abbreviation Meaning
ADP -	 Automatic Data Processing
AIS -	 Automated Information System
AOSS -	 Automated Office Support Systems
ARC -	 Ames Research Center
CAI -	 Computer-Assisted Instruction
CCSM -	 (NASA) - Center Computer Security Manager
CCSP -	 (Field) Center Computer Security Plan
COMSEC -	 Communications Security
CPU -	 Central Processing Unit
CRT -	 Cathode Ray Tube
CSAT -	 Computer Security Awareness and Training
CSC -	 Computer Security Coordinator
CSIR -	 Computer Security Incident Response
CSM -	 Computer Security Manager
CSP -	 Computer Security Plan
DAA -.	 Designated Approving Authority
DBMS -	 Data Base Management System
DOC -	 Department of Commerce
DOE -	 Department of Energy
DOD -	 Department of Defense
DOJ -	 Department of Justice
DPI -	 Data Processing Installation
DPI-CSO -	 Data Processing Installation Computer
Security Official
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DPI-CSP -	 Data Processing Installation Computer Security Plan
E.O. -	 Executive Order
FBI -	 Federal Bureau of Investigation
FIPS PUB -	 Federal Information Processing Standard Publication
FIRMR -	 Federal Information Resources Management Regulation
FY -	 Fiscal Year
GSA -	 General Services Administration
GSFC -	 Goddard Space Flight Center
HQ -	 Headquarters (NASA)
IDS -	 IntruRion Detection System
IRM -	 Information Resources Management
ITSP -	 Information Technology Systems Plan
LaRC -	 Langley Research Center
LCM -	 Life-Cycle Management
LeRC -	 Lewis Research Center
JPL -	 Jet Propulsion Laboratory
JSC -	 Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
KSC -	 John F. Kennedy Space Center
MCSC -	 Microcomputer Security Coordinator
MSFC -	 Georg-. C. Marshall Space Flight Center
NASA -	 National Aeronautics and Space Administration
MCSC -	 National Computer Security Center
NHB -	 NASA Handbook
NIST -	 National Institute of Standards and Technology
NMI -	 NASA Management Instruction
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NTISSC -	 National Telecommunications and Information
Systems Security Committee
NTISSI -	 National Telecommunications and Information
Systems Security Instruction
NSA -	 National Security Agency
NSDD -	 National Security Decision Directive
OMB -	 Office of Management and Budget
OPM -	 Office of Personnel Management
OPSEC -	 Operations Security
PC -	 Personal Computer
PCL -	 Personnel (Security) Clearance
PDS -	 Protected Distribution System
PO-CSM -	 (NASA HQ) Program Office Computer Security
Manager
PO-CSP -	 (NASA HQ) Program Office Computer Security
Plan
I
SAISS -	 Subcommittee on Automated Information Systems
Security (NTISSC)
SSC -	 John C. Stennis Space Center
U.S.C. -	 United States Code
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APPENDIX C. DEFINITIONS
ACCEPTABLE RISK - A level of risk at which there is reasonable
assurance of management acceptance. In practice,
acceptability of risk is a judgement call, based on local
details (e.g., security specifications, systems testing
results, appropriateness and completeness of the
requirements definitions, perceptions of the threat
environments, and compliance with applicable policies).
ACCESS CONTROL - The process of limiting access to information or
to resources of a computer system to authorized users.
ACCESS CONTROL MEASURES - Hardware and software features,
physical controls, operating procedures, management
procedures, and various combinations of these designed to
detect or prevent unauthorized access to a computer system
and to enforce access control.
ACCOUNTABILITY - The property that enables activities on a
computer system to be traced to individuals who can then be
held responsible for their activities.
ACCOUNTABILITY INFORMATION - A set of records, often referred to
as an audit trail, that provides documentary evidence of
processing, or other actions related to the security of a
computer system.
ACCREDITATION - The formal declaration by a designaLed official
that an automated information system or network is approved
to operate:
•	 In a particular security mode;
•	 With a prescribed set of technical and
nontechnical security safeguards;
•	 Against a defined threat;
•	 In a given operational environment;
•	 Under a stated operational concept;
•	 With stated interconnections to other automatic
information systems or networks; and
•	 At an acceptable level of risk for which the
accrediting official has formally assumed
responsibility.
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The accreditation statement affixes security responsibility
with the accrediting official and shcws that appropriate
care has been taken for security.
ADMINISTRATIVE SECURITY - The management procedures and
constraints, operational procedures, accountability
procedures, and supplemental controls established to provide
an acceptable level of protection for classified
information.
APPLICATION - A set of commands, instructions, and procedures,
usually in software, which cause a computer system to
process information. To avoid confusion in this Handbook,
the phrase "automated application" is normally used.
APPLICATION INTERNAL CONTROLS - Security controls in the
application software. The objectives of these controls
include information validation, user identity verification,
user service authorization verification, journaling,
variance detection, and encryption.
APPROPRIATE - Actions, policies, procedures, or events that are
reasonably defensible, based on local environments, risk
assessments, and generally accepted practices. Since the
NASA Computer Security Program Manager does not and cannot
prescribe sufficient and reasonable detailed procedures for
all situations NASA-wide, local managers must make many
decisions concerning the appropriateness of local actions,
policies, procedures, and events. These decisions will be
discussed during regular: management reviews by NASA HQ
personnel.
ASSURANCE TESTING - A process used to determine that the security
features of a system are implemented as designed, and that
they are adequate for the proposed environment. This
process may include hands-on functional testing, penetration
testing, and/or verification.
AUTHENTICATION - The act of verifying the claimed identity of an
individual, station, or originator.
AUTHORIZATION - The privil.ey- granted to an individual by a
designated official to access information based upon the
individual's clearance and need-to-know.
AUTOMATED INFORMATION - All recorded information regardless of
its media form (e.g., audible tone; paper; magnetic core,
tape, or disk; microform; electronic signal; and
visual/screen displays) that is processed by or stored for
the purpose of being processed by a computer system. The
terms "automated information," "automated data,"
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"information," and "data" are considered synonymous and used
interchangeably in this Handbook.
AUTOMATED INFORMATION RESOURCES - Data and information;
computers, ancillary equipment, software, firmware, and
similar procedures; services, including support services;
and related resources used for the acquisition, storage,
manipulation, management, movement, control, display,
switching, interchange, transmission, or reception of data
or information.
AUTOMATED OFFICE SUPPORT SYSTEMS (AOSS) - AOSS includes
stand-alone microprocessors, word processors, r-mory
typewriters, and terminals connected to mainfra...;.
AVAILABILITY - The state that exists when data can be obtained
within an acceptable period of time.
CATEGORY - A grouping of information for which specific labelling
and/or handling must be used and which should influence the
choice of computer security controls. This Handbook lists
13 of these information categories.
EN R - A major NASA site as defined in NMI 1101.2, "NASA
Organization and Definition of Terms." The following are
considered NASA centers:
•	 Amas Research Center (ARC)
•	 George C. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC)
•	 Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC)
•	 John C. Stennis Space Center (SSC)
•	 J(.hn F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC)
•	 Lanaley Research Center (LaRC)
•	 Lewis Research Center (LeRC)
•	 Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC)
•	 NASA Headquarters (HQ)
CERTIFICATION - A written ackr :Pledgement (by a NASA management
official) that there is ­: .-sonable assurance that an
automated application anu its automated environment:
•	 Meet all applicable NASA and other Federal
policies, regulations, and standards covering
security; nd
Have been tested and technically evaluated
thoroughly enough to demonstrate that the
installed security controls are adequate.
Certification is based on applicable vulnerability analyses,
risk analyses, management reviews, testing reports, etc.
Certification is them final management decision point in the
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quality control process wh-ch assures the automated
application and the current operational environment (such
as, hardware, operating systems, communications systems, and
multiuser security packages) are sufficiently secure to
support that automated application.
CLASSIFIED COMPUTER SECURITY PROGRAM - All of the technological
safeguards and managerial procedures established and applied
to computer facilities and computer systems (including
computer hardware, software, and data) in order to ensure
the protection of classified information.
CLASSIFIED DATA/CLASSIFIED INFORMATION - Top Secret, Secret,
and/or Confidential information, regardless of category, for
which NASA is responsible, and which requires safeguarding
in the interest of national security.
CLEARING - The overwriting of information on magnetic media such
that the media may be reused. (This does not change the
classification level of the media.) For example, volatile
memory can be "cleared" by removing power from the unit for
a minimum of one minute.
COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (COMSEC1 - The protection resulting from
all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons
information of value that might be derived from the
possession and study of telecommunications, or to mislead
unauthorized persons in their interpretation of the result_
of such possession and study.
COMPLIANCE REVIEW - A review and examination of records,
procedures, and review activities at a DPI in order to
assess the computer security posture and ensure compliance
with this Handbook. This review is normally conducted by
the CCSM at a field center having cognizance over the DPI
and having management responsibilities for implementing this
Handbook.
COMPROMISE - The disclosure of classified data to persons who are
not authorized to receive such data.
COMPROMISING EM.NATIONS (TEMPEST) - Unintentional data-related or
intelligence-bearing signals that, if intercepted and
analyzed, could disclose classified information being
transmitted, received, handled, or otherwise processed by
any information processing equipment.
COMPUTER FACILITY - One or more rooms, generally contiguous,
containing the elements of a computer system.
C_QMPUTER SECURITY INCIDENT - An adverse event associated with a
computer system that results in:
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•	 A failure to comply with security regular:ions or
directives;
•	 An attempted, suspected, or actual compromise of
sensitive or classified information;
•	 The waste, fraud, abuse, loss, or damage of'
Government property or information; or
The discovery of a vulnerability.
COMPUTER SYSTEM - A logical aggregation of automated information
resources into a related set of processing capabilities
performing one or a series of generally related tasks. For
example, interconnected mainframe computers, served by
front-end communications processors, maintained and operated
under a specific contract, and associated peripheral
input/output and storage devices, performing a number of
administrative tasks could be considered a "computer
system." A single minicomputer supporting a variety of
graphics work stations and/or controlling experimental
equipment could also be considered a "computer system."
Included in this definition are word processors,
microprocessors, personal computers, controllers, AOSS,
memory typewriters, and other stand-alone or special
computer systems.
CONFIDENTIALITY - "he state that exists when data are held in
confidence ana are protected from unauthorized disclosure.
CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT - Control of changes made to a computer
system's hardware, software, and/or documentation (including
an inventory of the system elements) throughout the
development and operational life of the system.
CONTINGENCY PLAN - A document, developed in conjunction with
application owners and maintained at the primary and backup
computer installation, which describes procedures and
identifies the personnel necessary to respond to abnormal
situations (including disasters). Contingency plans help
managers ensure that computer application owners continue to
process (with or without computers) mis--ion-critic-
applications in the event that computer support is
interrupted.
CRITICAL RESOURCES - Those physical and information assets
required for the performance of the installation's mission.
CRITICALITY RAT N - An importance-related and/or time-related
designation assigned to a computer application that
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indicates when it must be back in operation to avoid mission
impacts after a disaster or interruption in computer support
services a^ a multiuser installation. To facilitate
prioritized recovery procedures and for operating at offsite
backup facilities in a degraded mode, computer applications
should be assigned criticality ratings of varying importance
(e.g., most critical, critical, important, deferrable).
Applications with the same criticality rating should be
additionally ranked (e.g., numerically) according to
installation-determined processing priorities and
perceptions of importance.
DATA PROCESSING INSTALLATION WPI) - A logical grouping or one or
more computer systems with common environmental and/or
security characteristics for computer security management
purposes.
DESTRUCTION - The physical alteration of computer system media or
computer system components such that they can no longer be
used for storage or retrieval of information.
DISASTER RECOVERY PLANS - Documents containing procedures for
emergency response, extended backup operations, and
post-disaster recovery should a computer installation
experience a partial or total loss of computer resources and
physical facilities. The primary objectives of these plans,
in conjunction with contingency plans, are to provide
reasonable assurance that a computer installation can
recover from such incidents, continue to process
mission-critical applications in a degraded mode and return
to a normal mode of operation within a reasonable time. Such
plans are a protective measure generally applied based on
assessments of risk, cost, benefit, and feasibility and an
evaluation of other protective measures in place.
EXCLUSION AREA - A security area for the protection of classified
materials where mere access to the area would result in
access to those classified materials.
INFORMATION - The terms "information," "data," "material,"
"documents," and "matter" are cons.dered synonymous and used
interchangeably in this Handbook. They refer to all data
regardless of its physical form (e.g., data on paper
printouts, tapes, disks or disk packs, in memory chips, in
Randcm Access Memory (RAM), in Read Only Memory (ROM), on
microfilm or microfiche, on communication lines, and on
display terminals).
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INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) - The planning, budgeting,
organizing, directing, training , and control of information
and related resources ( such as personnel, equipment, funds,
and technology).
INSTALLATION SECURITY OFFICER - The designated Security officers
at a NASA Center who are responsible for the center's
personnel, physical, information, industrial, and operations
security programs.
INTEGRITY - The state that exists when computerized data are the
same as those in the source documents or have been correctly
computed from source data and have not been exposed to
accidental or malicious alteration or destruction.
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION - Classified information defined as
intelligence information by Director of Central Intelligence
Directive 1/19.
LABEL - The marking of an item of information to reflect its
information category and/or sec4^-ity classification. An
internal label is contained within the confines of the
medium containing the information and reflects the
classification and sensitivity of that information. An
external label is a visible and readable marking on the
outside of the medium (or the cover of the medium) that
reflects the category and/or classification of the
information within the medium.
LIMITED AREA - A security area for the protection of classified
matter where guards, security inspectors, or other internal
controls can prevent access.
LONG-RANGE PLAN - A written description of the strategy for
implementing a program covering the next 5 years.
MULTILEVEL SYSTEMS - Systems/networks that incorporate the mode
of operation that allows two or more classification levels
(including unclassified) of information to be processed
simultaneously within the same system when some users are
not cleared for all levels of information present.
MANAGEMENT REVIEW - A review and examination of records,
activities, policies, and procedures established by field
centers to manage and coordinate computer security programs
under their cognizance. This review is normally conducted
by Headquarters personnel with NASA-wide computer security
program management responsibilities.
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MISSION-CRITICAL INFORMATION - Plain text or machine-encoded data
that, as determined by competent authority (e.g.,
information owners), have high importance related to
accomplishing a NASA mission and require special protection
because unnecessary delays in processing could adversely
affect the ability of NASA, an owner organization, or a NASA
center to accomplish such missions.
NETWORK - A communications medium and all components attached to
that medium that are responsible for the transfer of
information. Such components may include computer systems,
packet switches, telecommunications controllers, key
distribution centers, technical control devices, and other
networks.
NON-FEDERAL PERSONNEL - Nor,-civil servant employees. The use of
the term non-Federal personnel in paragraph 306 of this
Handbook does not include foreign nationals.
QPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC) - OPSEC is the process of denying
adversaries information about friendly intentions,
capabilities, plans and programs by identifying, controlling
and protecting intelligence information and indicators
associated with planning and conducting military operations
as well as other defense activities not already afforded
adequate protection as classified information.
PASSWORD - A protected word, phrase, or a string of symbols that
is used to authenticate the identity of a user.
FSSWORD SPACE - The total number of possible passwords that can
be created by a given password generation scheme.
PERSONNEL SCREENING - A protective measure applied to determine
that an individual's access to sensitive information is
admissible. The need for and extent of the screening
process is normally based on an assessment of risk, cost,
benefit, and feasibility, as well as other protective
measures in place. Effective screening processes are
applied in such a way as to allow a range of implementation,
from minimal procedures to more stringent procedures
commensurate with the sensitivity of the data to be accessed
and the magnitude of harm or loss that could be caused by
the individual.
PERSONNEL SECURITY - The procedures established to ensure that
all personnel who have access to classified information have
the required authorization, as well as the appropriate
clearances.
PHYSICAL SECURITY - The use of locks, guards, badges, alarms,
procedures, and similar measures (alone or in combination)
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to control access to a computer system and related
equipment, and structures from espionage, theft, waste,
fraud, abuse, or damage by accident, fire, and environmental
hazards.
PROGRAM OFFICE (HEADQUARTERS) - A focal point within NASA HQ
(such as Codes M, O, R, and S) with management control
responsibility for research and development activity within
their functional area at NASA field centers.
PROPERTY PROTECTION AREA - An area set aside nor the protection
of property, as required by this Handbook.
PROTECT AS RESTRICTED DATA (PARQ) - A handling method for
computer-generated numerical data, or related information,
which is not readily recognized as classified or
unclassified because of the high volume of output and low
density of potentially classified data. Information is
designated as PARD because it has nit had a sensitivity
(classification) review and must be protected under a
different set of security rules.
PROTECTED DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (PDS) - A telecommunications system
to which acoustical, electrical, electromagnetic, and
physical safeguarus have been applied to permit its use for
secure electrical or optical transmission of unencrypted
classified information or sensitive unclassified
information.
PROTECTION INDEX - A measure of perceived risk determined from
the combination of the clearance level of users and the
classification of the data on the classified computer
system. The determination of this index is described in
Chapter 8.
PROTECTION MEASURES - Physical, administrative, personnel, and
technical security measures that, when applied separately or
in combination, are designed to reduce the probability of
harm, loss, damage to, or compromise of, a computer system
or automated information.
QUALITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT - A risk assessment that uses labels
(slich as, high, medium, and low), rather than actual
numbers, to characterize anticipated likelihood and extent
of harm to automated information resources.
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT - A risk assessment that requires
the ur.e of actual numbers, calculations of Annual Loss
Expectancy (ALE), and mathematical probabilities to
characterize the anticipated likelihood and extent of harm
to automated information resources.
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RECERTIFICATION - An ongoing assurLnce that a previously
certified system has been periodically reviewed, that
compliance with established protection policies and
procedures remains in effect, and that security risks remain
at an ac.:eptable level.
RISK ASSESSMENT - An identification of a specific computer
facility's assets, the threats to these assets, and the
computer facility's vulnerability to those threats. Risk
assessment is a management tool that provides a systematic
approach for:
•	 Determining the -r'.ative value and ,,ensitivity of
computer instal -..ion assets;
•	 Assessing vulnerabilities;
•	 Assessing loss expectancy or perceivee risk exposure
levels;
•	 Assessing existing protection features and additional
protection alternatives or acceptance of risk; and
•	 Documenting management decisions.
Decisions for implementing additional protection features
are normally based on the existence of a reasonable ratio
between cost/benefit of the safeguard and sensitivity/value
of the assets to be protected. Risk assessments may vary
from an informal review of a small-scale microcomputer
installation to a more formal and fully-documented analysis
(i.e, risk analysis) of a large-scale computer installation.
Risk assessment methodologies may vary from qualitative or
quantitative approaches to any combination of these two
approaches.
SANITIZATION - The elimination of classified information from a
computer system or media associated with a computer system
to permit the reuse of the computer system or media at a
lower classification level, or to permit the release to
uncleared personnel or personnel without the proper
information access authorizations.
SSECURITY AREA - A physically defined space containing classified
matter (documents or material) subject to physical
protection and personnel access controls.
SECURITY DESIGN REVIEW - A review process in which the objective
is to ascertain whether implemented protective measures meet
the original system design and approved computer application
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security requirements. The security design review may be a
separate activity or an integral function of the overall
application system design review activity.
SENSITIVE ADP POSITION - A personnel position that cannot be
occupied until completion of an employee background check.
SENSITIVE INFORMATION - Plain text or machine-encoded data that,
as determined by competent authority (e.g., information
owners), have relative sensitivity and require mandatory
protection because of statutory or regulator- restrictions
(e.g., "for official use only" information, information
subject to the Privacy Act of 1974, etc.) or require a
degree of discretionary protection because inadvertent or
deliberate misuse, alteration, disclosure, or destruction
could adversely affect National or other NASA interests
(e.g., program- critical information or controlled
scientific and technical information, which may include
computer codes (computer programs) used to process such
information).
SENSITIVITY AND/OR CRITICALITY LEVE JU - Four NASA hierarchical
groupings (labeled 0 through 3) used to help determine which
computer security controls are needed.
SHORT-RANGE PLAN - A 1-year (i.e., tactical) plan.
SIGNIFICANT CHANGE - A change in a computer installation that
could impact overall processing requirements and conditions
or installation security requirements (e.g., adding a local
area network; changing from batch to online processing;
adding dial-up capability; carrying out major hardware
configuration upgrades; operating system changes; making
major changes to the physical installation; or changing
installation location).
SIGNIFICANT COMPUTER SECURITY INCIDENT - An event that would be
of concern to senior NASA management due to potential for
public interest or embarrassment to the organization, or
potential for occurrence at other NASA sites. These events
may include: unauthorized access, theft, an interruption to
computer service or protective controls, an incident
involving damage, a disaster, or discovery of a
vulnerability,
SPONSOR/OWNER
	 The local management individual with overall
responsibility for the functional area supported by the an
automated application. The sponsor/owner is the person
responsible for development of functionai security
requirements.
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SYSTEM DESIGNER - The person who interprets the functional
security requirements (developed by the application
sponsor/owner) and designs the technical security
specifications.
,SYSTEM DEVELOPER - The person who incorporates the technical
security specifications into an operational system.
TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS - A study to determine alternative
controls for reducing identified risks.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECURITY - The domain of computer security
that is concerned with protecting the point-to-point
communication (e.g., input device to computer, computer to
computer, etc.) of sensitive unclassified information with
appropriate cost-effective measures (e.g., data encryption
and protected distribution systems). Such communications
generally occur via data communication systems, links, and
devices such as wide area networks, local area networks,
telephone/wire lines, fiber optics, radio waves/microwaves,
and integrated circuits.
TEMPEST - A code name referring to the investigation and study of
compromising emanations. It is sometimes used synonymously
with the term "compromising emanations" (e.g., TEMPEST tests
and TEMPEST inspections).
TRUSTED COMPUTER SYSTEM - A system that employs sufficient
hardware and software integrity measures to allow its use
for simultaneously processing a range of classified
information.
USER - Any individual who can operate any equipment, implement a
procedure that can access the computer system, input
commands to the computer system, or receive output from the
computer system without intervention of an authorized
reviewing official. Note that a user may not necessarily be
an authorized user of a computer system.
VERIFIABLE IDENTIFICATION FORWARDS - An identification method
used in networks that allows the sending host to verify that
an authorized user on its system is attempting a connection
to another host. The sending host transmits the required
user authentication information to the receiving host. The
receiving host can then verify that the user is validated
for access to its system. This operation may be transparent
to the user.
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APPENDIX E. CLASSIFIED SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN
A classified system security plan is prepared as the basic
system security document and as evidence that the proposed
classified computer system, or update to an existing classified
computer system, meets the appropriate computer security program
requirements for classified processing. The plan is used
throughout the certification and accreditation process and serves
for the lifetime of the system as the forma! record of the system
and its environment as approved for operation. It also serves as
the basis for inspections of classified systems. The CCSM shall
maintain a current copy of all approved system security plans for
the installation. The DAA shall maintain current accreditation
documentation of systems for which they are the designated
approving authority (i.e., accrediting official).
Note: A classified system security plan may contain classified
information and shall be marked and protected according to NASA's
established policies and procedures for classified handling.
1. ATTACHED DOCUMENTS. Where sections of the following
information are common to several classified computer systems at
an installation, the information may be contained in a separate
document and that document attached to or referenced in each
system security plan.
2. CLASSIFIED SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN CONTENTS. The plan formally
documents the operation of a classified system and the mechanisms
that are used to control access and protect the system and its
information. To make appropriate accreditation decisions, the
DAA needs to understand the complete system environment.
Therefore, at a minimum, each plan shall contain the following
information:
a. The identification and location of the computer system.
b. The name, location, and phone number of the responsible
CCSM or DPI-CSO.
c. A narrative description of the classified computer system
and the rules for permitting and denying access to the
information that is processed, stored, transferred, or accessed
by the system. These rules must describe how access will be
controlled based on the classification of information processed,
and the clearance level and need-to-know of users.
d. A description of the system's computing environment that
includes at least:
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(1) Determination of the protection requirements for the
system.
(2) Description of the methods used to meet the above
protection requirements including a description of security
related software.
(3) The level and amount of classified information to be
processed, stored, transferred, or accessed in the system.
(4) The architecture of the system, including all
hardware components, showing the organization, interconnections,
and interfaces of these components. (A schematic drawing may be
used to satisfy this requirement.)
(5) A detailed inventory of the classified system
components including software and hardware.
(6) Description of the control mechanisms to be used for
review and approval of modifications to the classified system.
e. The evidence, or basis for certification, that each of
the requirements of this Handbook have been met. This description
shall specifically address the requirements of at least the
following areas:
(1) Personnel Security.
(2) Physical Security.
(3, Telecommunications Security.
(4) Hardware and Software Security:
(5) Administrative Security.
f. A description of the management controls established to
prevent waste, fraud, and abuse.
g. A risk assessment that provides a measure of the relative
vulnerabilities and threats.
h. A description of the security training required for the
personnel associated with the classified computing system.
i. The procedures to be used by the personnel associated
with the classified system for reporting any computer security
incidents to appropriate management. These procedures shall
include the actions to ue taken to secure the classified system
during a security-related incident.
J. The contingency plan and recovery procedures for the
classified system, including the designation of persons
responsible for carrying out particular procedures, and the plan
for testing the operations of the contingency plan.
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k. A description of the process used to protect the current
backup copies of critical software, information, and
documentation.
1. Escort procedures, including procedures unique to this
classified system.
m. A description of the controls for access to the
classified system. If passwords are used for access control,
describe how they are selected, their length, the size of the
password space, etc.
n. The procedures for operating the system in an interim
period during updates or changes to the system.
o. If remote diagnostic services arc to be used, specify the
methods of connection and disconnection and related security
measures.
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